臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　本文從監理假設（monitoring hypothesis）與道德風險假設（moral hazard hypothesis）這二種角度探討了公司投保董監事責任保險（D&O保險）與併購（M&As）效益之間的關係。我們對2008年至2019年期間臺灣上市公司所發布124筆併購宣告樣本所進行之研究發現，主併公司若投保較高額的董監事責任保險，與低保額之公司相比，能透由併購的途徑為股東帶來更好的收益價值。這種正向關係在具有高代理成本的主併公司中更為明顯，其表現於具有高度的盈餘管理、高度的控制權和現金流量權偏離、處於低度競爭之行業別和較低的機構法人持有比率之公司。同時，　　研究也發現投保董監事責任保險的公司與併購後經營績效的改善有所關聯。
　　綜合以上，本研究的實證結果支持了監理假設的研究推論，研究結果表示公司投保較高額的董監事責任保險，對公司能產生更嚴格的監理和控制作為，強化公司治理的效果，從而對併購交易的價值產生顯著的正向影響。

We examine the association between Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance (D&O insurance) and the valuation of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), from the perspective of the monitoring hypothesis versus the moral hazard hypothesis. Employing a sample of 124 M&A announcements made by listed firms in Taiwan during the period 2008–2019, we find that high D&O insured acquiring firms experience significantly better benefits for shareholders through M&A deals in comparison to low-insured firms. Further analysis suggests that a positive relationship is more evident among acquirers with high agency cost (identified by a high degree of earnings management and control-cash flow right deviation, low degree of competitive industry and institutional ownership).
We also find that D&O Insurance is associated with improvement in the post-M&A operating performance. Overall, our findings support the prediction of the monitoring hypotheses, implying that firms with high-level D&O Insurance can lead to strict corporate monitoring and control to strengthen the effectiveness of corporate governance. Consequently, it exerts a positive influence on valuation form M&A transactions.

摘 要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌 謝 iii
目 錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
壹、緒論 1
一、研究背景與動機 1
二、研究目的與方法 3
三、主要研究結果 5
四、主要研究貢獻 6
五、研究架構 6
貳、文獻探討與假說發展 8
一、監理假設之論述 8
二、道德風險假設之論述 10
參、研究設計與實施 11
一、樣本選擇 11
二、變數定義 13
(一)應變項 13
(二)自變項 13
肆、實證結果與分析 15
一、描述性統計分析 15
二、單變量分析 17
三、橫斷面迴歸分析 19
四、穩健性分析 22
(一)考量盈餘管理的影響 22
(二)考量股權偏離的影響 25
(三)考量產業競爭的影響 27
(四)考量法人股東的影響 29
(五)併購交易後的長期績效表現 31
伍、結論 33
參考文獻 34
附錄、變數定義 39

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