臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　1997歷經亞洲金融風暴以來，全球相繼發生財務弊端事件，公司治理議題在全世界逐漸受到重視，本研究主要是探討在董事會性別多元化的思維下，公司治理與總經理替換間的代理問題。本研究採用2018年上市公司為研究樣本，並以資產報酬率、女性董事比率、獨立董事比率為主要解釋變數，並採用邏輯斯迴歸模型（Logistic Regression）來驗證分析。
　　實證分析結果顯示當公司績效愈差，則總經理替換機率就愈大，公司的經營運作具有良好的內部控制，符合公司治理機制。此外，探討之女性董事之於董事會監督功能，是否發揮女性特質，進而透過監督而影響總經理（CEO）替換，實證結果不具統計顯著性，可能是目前女性董事比率太低(佔13%)之緣故，以致於無法發揮其監督之顯著效果，或者是本研究只觀察2018年尚且無法看出端倪。亦即，公司在以公司績效—總經理替換為基準的考核制度下，女性董事並未發揮其女性特質，強化董事會監督功能，當公司經營績效愈差時，並沒有因為女性董事比率增加，在提高監督職能強度之情況下，而增加總經理被替換的程度。最後，公司的控制股東已實際掌握公司的控制權，使得獨立董事對總經理替換之監督功能受到限制，無法發揮有效的外部獨立董事之實質監督管理功能，降低公司代理問題。

　　Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, a lot of financial fraud have happened around the world. Many critical comments as to issues such as corporate governance have gradually received attention. This study, from the perspective of board gender diversity, is mainly to discuss the agency problem between corporate governance and CEO turnover. The listed companies of year 2018 used as the research sample and ROA (return on assets), the ratio of female directors and the ratio of independent directors were used as explanatory variables in this study. The logistic regression used to analyze the empirical results,
　　The empirical results appear that the lower the company’s performance the higher the CEO turnover. As long as the company's operation has a better internal control, the company's governance mechanism shall be in line with accordingly. In addition, the issue of whether female directors play the key role of the supervision function in the board of directors and then further influence on the CEO turnover through supervision have been discussed. However, the empirical results are not statistically significant. It may be that the ratio of female directors is too low at present, and/or that the clues were not observable in the short term. In other words, the evaluation system based on worse performance-higher CEO turnover relation did not happen under gender diversity in this study. Finally, the controlling shareholders actually have taken control the supervisory function, which caused independent directors fail to enhance the intensity of CEO supervision and further to reduce corporate agency problems.

摘 要 I
Abstract II
誌　謝 III
目　錄 V
表目錄 VI
圖目錄 VII
第一章 緒論 8
第一節 研究背景與動機 8
第二節 研究目的 10
第三節 研究架構 12
第二章 文獻探討與假說建立 13
第一節 公司治理、代理理論與總經理（CEO）替換 13
第二節 董事性別多元化與總經理（CEO）的替換 15
第三節 獨立董事與總經理（CEO）的替換 18
第四節 以績效為基準的考核制度與總經理（CEO）的替換 20
第三章 研究方法 21
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 21
第二節 模型建立與變數衡量 23
第三節 變數定義 24
第四章 實證結果與分析 28
第一節 敘述性統計 28
第二節 相關係數分析 29
第三節 實證結果與分析 32
第四節 敏感性分析 35
第五章 結論與建議 44
第一節 研究結論 44
第二節 研究限制與後續研究建議 46
參考文獻 47

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