臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以2006年至2017年的台灣上市公司為樣本，探討高階管理階層教育程度如何影響公司信用風險。以台灣經濟新報資料庫所編制的信用風險指標TCRI為公司信用風險代理變數，並以同一家公司中的高階管理階層擁有碩士以上學歷之比例來衡量高階管理階層教育程度，本文獲得三項主要研究結果：第一，台灣上市公司的管理階層教育程度較高 (低) 時，通常面臨較低 (高) 的信用風險。第二，管理階層教育程度對於信用風險的減緩能力，在公司治理制度較佳的公司中更為明顯。第三，僅有管理階層教育程度對於公司信用風險具有顯著解釋能力，管理階層所擁有的財務、會計與企管學歷背景對於公司信用風險不具有顯著解釋能力。本文整體研究結論支持「組織正當性假說」：高階管理階層擁有較高 (低) 教育程度時，其公司組織正當性較高 (低)，使公司面臨較低 (高) 的破產成本，致使其公司信用風險程度較低 (高)。

Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms during 2006-2017, this paper examines how top managerial educational levels affect corporate credit risk. By employing TCRI as a proxy for credit risk and the proportion of postgraduate degrees across all top managers in a firm as a proxy for top managerial educational levels, our study generate three major empirical results. First, firms with highly (lowly) educated top managers tend to exhibit lower (higher) credit risk. Second, the inverse effect of top managerial educational levels on credit risk is more evident among firms with good corporate governance. Third, managerial educational levels, but not professional backgrounds in finance, accounting, and business management, matter for the corporate credit risk. Overall, our empirical evidence are supported by the organizational legitimacy hypothesis, postulating that higher managerial education levels lead to well organizational legitimacy, which mitigates the likelihood of default and implies a lower corporate credit risk.

中文摘要 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- i
英文摘要 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ii
誌謝 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- iii
目錄 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- iv
表目錄 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- v
圖目錄 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- vi
第一章 前言--------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
第一節 研究背景與動機------------------------------------------------------ 1
第二節 研究目的--------------------------------------------------------------- 2
第三節 研究假說--------------------------------------------------------------- 3
第四節 主要研究結果--------------------------------------------------------- 5
第五節 研究貢獻--------------------------------------------------------------- 7
第五節 研究架構--------------------------------------------------------------- 8
第二章 文獻回顧與假說發展------------------------------------------------ 9
第一節 管理階層教育程度的「組織正當性假說」--------------------- 9
第二節 管理階層教育程度的「管理者過度自信假說」--------------- 10
第三章 研究樣本說明--------------------------------------------------------- 11
第一節 樣本選擇與變數定義------------------------------------------------ 11
第二節 變數敘述統計量------------------------------------------------------ 14
第三節 相關性分析------------------------------------------------------------ 15
第四章 實證結果分析--------------------------------------------------------- 19
第一節 單變量分析：管理階層教育程度與信用風險程度------------- 19
第二節 多變量迴歸分析------------------------------------------------------ 20
第三節 考慮公司治理效果--------------------------------------------------- 23
第四節 穩健性分析------------------------------------------------------------ 25
第五章 結論與建議------------------------------------------------------------ 28
參考文獻 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32

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