臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文研究CEO兼任獨立董事的監督效果，以股東權益面、公司成長面、公司成本面衡量，其中公司績效以ROE以及 Tobin’s Q 衡量，董監事酬勞作為衡量監督效果的直接變數，而本文的實證結果發現，公司績效並沒有因為CEO兼任獨立董事而有較高的監督效果，由於外在事件都會造成績效的變化，且董監事酬勞近年以平均方式揭露，因此較難以衡量CEO兼任獨立董事之薪酬。
本文結果發現，不論是以股東權益角度亦或是公司成長角度下，在CEO兼任獨立董事之公司下，CEO兼任獨立董事為同產業鏈時有顯著正相關，表示CEO設立獨立董事為相關產業鏈，不論業務關聯或上下游關係，以股東權益衡量皆對公司績效有正面幫助。

This paper studies the supervision effect of the CEO concurrently serving as an independent director, which is measured in terms of shareholder equity, company growth, and company cost. Company performance is measured by ROE and Tobin's Q. Remuneration of Directors and supervisors is used as a direct variable to measure the effect of supervision. The empirical results find that the company's performance does not have a high monitoring effect when the CEO is concurrently an independent director. One reason why the supervision effect is not obvious is because of the external cases. The external cases cause the company's performance which is no change. Second, the data which is the remuneration of directors and supervisors has been disclosed in a year, not a day or month. It is more difficult to measure the salary of the CEO as an independent director.
The results of this article found that the CEO is also an independent director and there is a significant positive correlation between the CEO and independent director as the same industry chain whether from the perspective of shareholder equity or the perspective of company growth in companies. This article also indicates that the CEO's establishment of independent directors is the relevant industry chain. Whether of business connection or upstream and downstream relationships, the measurement of shareholder equity has a positive impact on company performance.

中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 vi
壹、緒論 1
貳、文獻探討 3
參、資料來源及方法 7
一、研究假說 7
二、研究方法 7
(一) 資料來源 7
三、研究模型 15
肆、實證結果 18
伍、結論 38
陸、參考文獻 39
附錄一 42

1.王大維，2003，“公司治理相關要素與公司績效關聯性之研究—以台灣上市公司為例”，淡江大學會計研究所碩士論文。
2.李蕙汝，2012，“董監薪酬與公司績效之敏感性分析—家族與非家族企業之比較”，東海大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
3.李馨蘋，莊宗憲，2005，“股權結構與董事組成對公司績效之影響”，第九屆科技整合管理研討會，頁195~212，5月28日。
4.葉銀華，2008，實踐公司治理—台灣集團企業的功與過，聯經出版社，台北。
5.廖秀梅，李建然，吳祥華，2006，“董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究：兼論台灣家族因素的影響”，東吳經濟商學學報，54期，頁117~160，9月。
6.閻紹平，2012，“獨立董事、資訊透明度與公司績效之研究—台灣上市櫃公司之實證分析”，世新大學財務金融所在職專班。
7.Andres, Azofra, Lopez, 2005, “Corporate Board in OECD Countries: Size, Composition, Functioning, and Effectiveness”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol.13, issue 2, pp197-210.
8.Beasley, 1996, “An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud”, The Accounting Review, vol.71, pp 443-465.
9.Booth, James, Deli, 1996, “Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by CEOs”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 40 , pp81-104.
10.Brickley, James, 1987, “The Takeover Market, Corporate Board Composition, and Ownership Structure：The Case of Banking”, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 30, pp161-180.
11.Brown, Mark, Michael, Simmering, 2003, “Compensation Policy and Organizational Performance: The Efficiency, Operational, and Financial Implications of Pay Levels and Pay Structure” , The Academy of Management Journal , vol.46, pp752-762.
12.Chen, Wei, Yi, Lin, 2013, “Media coverage, board structure and CEO compensation: Evidence from Taiwan” , Journal of Multinational Financial Management, vol. 23, pp434-445.
13.Chung, Pruitt, 1994, “A Simple Approximation of Tobin's Q,” Financial Management, vol. 23, pp70-74.
14.Conyon, Leech, 1994, “Top pay, company performance and corporate governance”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 56, issue 3, pp229-247, August.
15.Core, Holthausen, Larcker, 1999,“Corporate Governance,Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol.51, pp 371-406.
16.Dalton, Catherine, Jonathan ,Alan ,1999 ,“Number of Directors and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis”, The Academy of Management Journal, vol.42, pp 674-686.
17.Dalton, Daily, Ellestrand, Johnson, 1998,“Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadship structure, and financial performance”, Strategic Management Journal, vol.19, pp269-290.
18.Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney, 1996, “Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC”, Contemporary Accounting Research, vol.13, ppl-36.
19.Finkelstein, Hambrick,1989, “Chief Executive Compensation: A Study of the Intersection of Markets and Political Process”, Strategic Management Journal, vol.10, pp121-134.
20.Frank, 2009, “The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance”, 95 VA. L. REV. 685.
21.Gales, Kesner,1994, “An analysis of board of director size and composition in bankrupt organizations”, Journal of Business Research, vol. 30, pp 271-282.
22.Gartner, Kaplan,1996,“The Value Maximizing Board”,Unpublished paper, University of Chicago.
23.Gregg, Machin, Szymanski, 1993, “The disappearing relationship between directors’ pay and corporate performance”, British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 31, issue 1, pp1-9, March.
24.Hermalin, Weisbach, 2003, “Board of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature”, Economic Policy Review, vol. 9, issue 1, pp7-26.
25.Jensen, Michael, and William,1976, “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3, issue 4, pp305-306.
26.Jensen, Murphy. 1990, “Performance pay and top management incentives”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, pp225-264, April.
27.Kosnik, 1987, “Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance,” Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 32, pp163-185.
28.Lindenberg, Ross, 1981, “Tobin's q Ratio and Industrial Organization,” Journal of Business, vol. 54, pp1-32.
29.Linn, Scott, Park, 2005, “Outside Director Compensation Policy and the Investment Opportunity Set”, Journal of Corporate Finance, vol.11, pp680-715.
30.Lorsh, MacIver, 1989,“Pawns or potentates: The reality of America’s corporate boards”, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
31.Luan, Tang, 2007, “Where is Independent Director Efficacy?” , Corporate Governance: An International Review, vol. 15 , pp636-643.
32.Main, 1991, “Top executive pay and performance”, Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 12, issue 3, pp219-229, June.
33.McConnell, Servaes, 1990, “Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 27, issue 2, pp595-612.
34.Murphy, Kevin, 1985, “Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis” , Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 7, pp11-42.
35.Nguyen, Nielsen, 2010, “ The Value of Independent Directors: Evidence from Sudden Deaths”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 98, issue 3, pp550-567.
36.Pound, 1988, “Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight” , Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 20, pp237-265.
37.Rosenstien, Wyatt, 1990, “Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol.26, pp 175-191.
38.Shi, Hoskisson, Zhang, 2017, “Independent director death and CEO acquisitiveness: build an empire or pursue a quiet life? ”, Strategic Management Journal, vol. 38, pp780-792.
39.Singh, Harianto, 1989, “Management-board relationships, takeover risk, and the adoption of golden parachutes” , Academy of Management Journal, vol. 32 , pp7-24.
40.Weisbach, Michael, 1988, “Outside directors and CEO turnover”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol.20, pp 431-460.
41.Yermack, 1996, “Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 40, issue 2, pp185-211.
42.Zahra, Pearce, 1989,“Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model”, Journal of Management, vol.15, pp 291-334.