臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文針對2000年至2018年間，台灣上市公司曾宣告買回庫藏股為研究樣本並利用事件研究法作為其研究。本研究目的有二，其一在探討公司宣告買回庫藏股前後，其普通股價格是否存在顯著異常報酬，並進一步探討公司是否藉由宣告買回庫藏股，向投資人透露公司股價被低估，存在資訊不對稱。其二，本文探討公司為因應未來營運發展，進而融資或執行股利政策後，在特定期間內，宣告買回庫藏股是否存在顯著異常報酬，其中我們更深入探討公司執行政策後宣告買回庫藏股彼此間是否存在衝突。根據實證結果，公司宣告買回庫藏股後短期間存在顯著異常報酬；事件日前台灣上市公司，都有顯著負的累積異常報酬，事件日後有顯著正的累積異常報酬。本文在融資政策區分為現金增資、發行公司債及可轉換公司債；股利政策則區分為現金股利與股票股利，針對以上政策探討事件日後公司宣告買回庫藏股是否出現異常報酬，根據實證結果，確實存在異常報酬。

This paper examines the financial performance of Taiwanese firms 2000 to 2018 after their announcement of a share repurchase program. Two primary objectives of this study are as the following: first, we will discuss whether there is a significant abnormal return on the price of ordinary shares before, after the company announcement share repurchase. Furthermore, we also explore why the company announces a repurchase via open-market buying which means revealed to investors that the company's stock price is undervalued and there is information asymmetry between the insiders and the market. Second, the company will finance or implement the dividend policy to their operation every year, therefore, in this article we discuss whether the repurchase announcement effect is affected by prior financing choice or the firm’s dividend policy. Among them, we deeply explore whether this event is in conflict with each other. According to our result, we found that stock-repurchase announcements could cease the decline of share prices in short term. In this article, the financing policy is divided into Seasoned Equity Offering, issuance of corporate bonds and convertible corporate bonds; the dividend policy is distinguished between cash dividends and stock dividends. In response to the above policies, we explored whether the company announced abnormal return for the shares repurchase after the incident. According to the empirical results, there is indeed an abnormal remuneration.

Abstract........i
摘要........ii
Acknowledgements........iii
Table of Contents........iv
List of Tables........v
List of Figures........vi
Chapter 1 Introduction........1
Chapter 2 Literature Review........3
2.1 Literature review of share repurchases........3
2.1.1 The Information/Signaling Hypothesis........3
2.1.2 The Free Cash-Flow Hypothesis........4
2.1.3 Optimal Leverage Ratio Hypothesis........4
2.1.4 Management Incentive Hypothesis........5
2.1.5 Takeover Deterrence Hypothesis........5
2.2 Company financing and the share repurchase.......6
Chapter 3 Data ........8
3.1 Methodology ........8
3.2 Sample........11
Chapter 4 Empirical results........15
4.1 Repurchase events........17
4.2 The effect of shares repurchase after SEO........20
4.3 The effect of shares repurchase after bonds policy........22
4.4 The effect of shares repurchase after dividend policy........25
4.5 Implications of the results........ 27
Chapter 5 Conclusions........29
References........31
Extended Abstract........33

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