臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近年來，隨著時代的變遷與發展，現代女性意識抬頭，董事會性別多元化成強化公司治理為現今熱門探討的議題，女董事引起各國管理當局的重視，認為女性能更有效率的提供更好的監督功能，提升公司治理。本研究為探討董事會多元化對董事及總經理薪酬之影響，以2013〜2018年臺灣上市公司之董事為研究對象，採用追縱資料(panel data)探討公司董事會性別多元化，女董事對董事及總經理薪酬之影響，在女性董事愈多參與董事會是否能提供更有效的監督職責。實證結果顯示，女董事對董事薪酬呈現顯著正向關係，表示女董事並發未發揮其提升公司治理之監督機制。而在女董事對總經理(CEO)薪酬呈現顯著正向相關，表示面對非自身董事身份之薪酬，女性董事發揮女性特質並依據公司績效作為發放總經理(CEO)薪酬的基準。

In recent years, with the changes and development of the times, the consciousness of modern women has risen, and the gender diversity of the board of directors has become a hot topic of discussion today. The female directors have attracted the attention of management authorities in various countries, and they believe that women can provide better Supervise function to improve corporate governance. This study is to explore the impact of board diversity on the remuneration of directors and general managers. It takes the directors of listed companies in Taiwan from 2013 to 2018 as the research object and uses panel data to explore the gender diversity of the company’s board of directors. The influence of the general manager's salary is whether the more female directors participating in the board of directors can provide more effective supervision responsibilities. The empirical results show that female directors have a significant positive relationship with director compensation, indicating that female directors have also failed to use their supervisory mechanism to improve corporate governance. Female directors have a significant positive correlation with CEO’s compensation, indicating that female directors exert their feminine characteristics and use company performance as the basis for the payment of CEOs’ compensation.

摘 要 I
ABSTRACT II
誌 謝 III
目 錄 IV
表目錄 VI
圖目錄 VII
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 4
第二節 研究流程 5
第二章 文獻探討與假說建立 7
第一節　董事會與性別多元化 7
第二節　代理理論（Agency Theory） 11
第三節　董事、總經理薪酬與績效 14
第四節　家族企業之影響 16
第三章 研究方法 18
第一節　樣本選取與資料來源 18
第二節　追蹤資料(Panel Data) 20
第三節　實證模型及變數定義 26
第四章 實證結果與分析 30
第一節 敘述性統計 30
第二節 皮爾森相關係數 31
第三節 實證分析―Panel Data(追蹤資料) 34
第五章　結論與建議 46
第一節　研究結論 46
第二節 研究限制與後續研究建議 46
參考文獻 48

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