臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　本研究自行收集我國上市公司在2009-2017年期間的資本投資宣告樣本為基礎，分析董監事及重要職員責任保險（D＆O liability insurance）對公司資本投資經濟價值的影響。結果表明，儘管宣告中的異常收益平均顯著為正，但資本投資宣告公司若投保（無投保）D＆O責任保險將獲得較低（較高）的資本投資宣告異常收益，無投保D＆O保險與高D＆O保險承保範圍的資本投資宣告異常收益之差異具有顯著相關，表示道德風險假說有進一步探究的意義。與此同時，在更容易受到融資限制、更積極的盈餘管理、具有財務金融教育背景與受研究所以上教育的管理者、以及競爭性產業的資本投資公司，對於資本投資宣告異常收益的負面影響更為顯著。進一步的證據還表明，投保D＆O責任保險的公司進行資本投資，其長期以來股票價值表現不佳。總體結果支持道德風險假說，該假說表明投保D＆O責任保險的公司使董監事與重要職員免於擔負潛在的個人責任，從而加劇了代理問題並做出了錯誤的資本投資決策。

　　Based on a sample of corporate capital investment announcements manually collected by Taiwan listed companies from 2009 to 2017, this article explores the effect of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the economic valuation of corporate capital investment. The results show that although the abnormal returns in the announcement are on average significantly positive, a higher coverage of D&O insurance (lower or no) is associated with a lower (higher) abnormal return on corporate capital investment during the announcement period. Such negative effect is more pronounced in investment companies that are more susceptible to financial constraints, are more engaged in earnings management, have a higher level of education and management with a financial background, and stronger industry competition. Further evidence also shows that capital investment companies with high D&O insurance coverage have a significant long-run post-SEO underperformance. The overall results support the moral hazard hypothesis, which shows that D&O insurance coverage exempts directors and officers from potential personal liability, exacerbating agency problems and making poor capital investment decisions.

摘 要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌 謝 iii
目 錄 iv
表目錄 vi
圖目錄 vii

第一章、緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的與方法 2
1.3 主要研究結果 3
1.4 主要研究貢獻 4
1.5 研究架構 6

第二章、文獻探討與假說發展 7
2.1 董監事保險對資金成本之論述 7
2.2 董監事保險對代理人問題之論述 8

第三章、研究設計與實施 11
3.1 樣本選擇 11
3.2 變數定義 13
3.2.1資本投資宣告績效的應變數 13
3.2.2最感興趣的自變數 14
3.2.3其他變數 15

第四章、實證結果與分析 16
4.1敘述性統計分析 16
4.2單變量分析 19
4.3橫斷面迴歸分析 20
4.4穩健性分析 23
4.5考量融資限制的進一步證據 26
4.6考量盈餘管理的進一步證據 29
4.7考量教育程度的進一步證據 31
4.8考量產業競爭程度的進一步證據 33
4.9 長期投資後的股票表現 35

第五章、結論 39
參考文獻 41
附錄一、變數定義 48

1.Aharony, J., & Swary, I. (1980). Quarterly dividend and earnings announcements and stockholders’ returns: An empirical analysis. Journal of Finance, 35(1), 1-12.

2.Altman, E. I., (1984). A further empirical investigation of the bankruptcy cost question, Journal of Finance, 39(4), 1067-1089.

3.Baker, T., & Griffith, S. J., (2007). Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors & Officers Liability Insurance Market. The University of Chicago Law Review, 74, 487-544.

4.Barber, B. M., & Lyon, J. D. (1997). Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and specification of test statistics. Journal of Financial Economics, 43(3), 341-372.

5.Baum, J. A., & Oliver, C. (1991). Institutional linkages and organizational mortality. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2), 187-218.

6.Bhagat, S, J Bizjak and J L Coles (1998). The Shareholder Wealth Implications of Corporate Lawsuits. Financial Management, 27( 4), 5-27.

7.Bhagat, S., Brickley, J. A., & Coles, J. L., (1987). Managerial Indemnification and Liability Insurance: The Effect on Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 54(4), 721-736.

8.Blose, L. E., & Shieh, J. C. (1997). Tobin's q‐Ratio and Market Reaction to Capital Investment Announcements. Financial Review, 32(3), 449-476.

9.Boubakri, N., M. Boyer, and N. Challeb (2008). Management Opportunism in Accounting Choice: Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Purchases. Working Paper, HEC Montreal.

10.Boyer, M. M. and L. H. Stern (2014). D&O Insurance and IPO Performance: What Can We Learn from Insurers. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 23, 504-540.

11.Boyer, M., M., (2014). Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Shareholder Protection. Journal of Financial Perspectives, 2(1), 107-128.
12.Broadie, M., Chernov, M., and Sundresan, S. M., (2007). Optimal debt and equity values in the presence of chapter7 and chapter11. The Journal of Finance, 62(3) , 1341-1377.

13.Brown, S. J., & Warner, J. B. (1985). Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(1), 3-31.

14.Burgstahler, D. and Dichev, I., (1997). Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24, 99-129.

15.Carpenter, M. A., & Golden, B. R. (1997). Perceived managerial discretion: A study of cause and effect. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 187-206.

16.Certo, S. T. (2003). Influencing initial public offering investors with prestige: Signaling with board structures. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 432-446.

17.Chalmers, John M. R., Larry Y. Dann, and Jarrad Harford (2002). Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Purchases. The Journal of Finance, 57, 609–636.

18.Chan, K., Ikenberry, D. L., Lee, I., & Wang, Y. (2010). Share repurchases as a potential tool to mislead investors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16, 137-158.

19.Chen C. W., B. Yi. And B. J. Lin (2013). Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and Managerial Compensation. Journal of International Finance Studies, 13, 29-46.

20.Chen TJ and Pang CH (2008). An Analysis of Determinants of the Corporate Demand for Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance. NTU Management Review, 18(2),171-195.

21.Chen, S. S. (2006). The economic impact of corporate capital expenditures: Focused firms versus diversified firms. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41(2), 341-355.

22.Chen, S. S., & Ho, K. W. (1997). Market response to product-strategy and capital-expenditure announcements in Singapore: Investment opportunities and free cash flow. Financial Management, 26(3), 82-88.

23.Chan CC, Wu YC and Hsu YY (2012). The Effects of Financial Constraints on Corporate Earnings Management. Journal of Management & Systems, 19 (3), 463-494.

24.Chen CY, Su XQ, Chen CM, Chen MS (2019). Managerial Financial Education and the Valuation Effects of Seasoned Equity Offerings: Evidence from Taiwan. Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 28(6), 844-868.

25.Chung, Hyeesoo. H. and Jinyoung P. Wynn (2008). Managerial Legal Liability Coverage and Earnings Conservatism. Journal of Accounting andEconomics, 46, 135-153.

26.Chung, K. H., Wright, P., & Charoenwong, C. (1998). Investment opportunities and market reaction to capital expenditure decisions. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(1), 41-60.

27.Core, J. E., (1997). On the Corporate Demand for Directors' and Officers' Insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 64(1), 63-87.

28.Core, J.(2000). The Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Premium: An Outside Assessment of the Quality of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 16, 449-477.

29.Cornell, B., & Shapiro, A. C. (1987). Corporate stakeholders and corporate finance. Financial Management, 16(1), 5-14.

30.Daniel, B. and Thomas, P. (2006). CEO Incentives and Earnings Management. Journal of Financial and Economics, 80(3), 511-529.

31.Davis, G. F., & Mizruchi, M. S. (1999). The money center cannot hold: Commercial banks in the US system of corporate governance. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 215-239.

32.DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (Eds.). (1991). The new institutionalism in organizational analysis (Vol. 17). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

33.DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Collective rationality and institutional isomorphism in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 147-160.

34.Fama, E. (1980) Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, 280-307.

35.Fama, E. and Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-325.

36.Fazzari, S. M.,Hubbard, R. G.,Peterson, B. C. (1988). Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988(1), 141-195.

37.Gutierrez, Maria (2003). An Economic Analysis of Corporate Directors’ Fiduciary Duties. RAND Journal of Economics, 34, 516-535.

38.Hambrick, D. C., & Abrahamson, E. (1995). Assessing managerial discretion across industries: A multimethod approach. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 1427-1441.

39.Hambrick, D. C., & Finkelstein, S. (1987). Managerial discretion: A bridge between polar views of organizational outcomes. In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior, 9, 369-406.

40.Harford J (1999). Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. The Journal of Finance 54(6), 1969-1997

41.Holderness, C. G., (1990). Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors. International Review of Law and Economics, 10, 115-129.

42.Hou, K., and Robinson, D. T. (2006). Industry concentration and average stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1927-1956.

43.J. Chen, H. Hong, & J.C. Stein (2001). Forecasting crashes: trading volume, past returns, and conditional skewness in stock prices. Journal of financial Economics, 61(3), 345-381.

44.Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76(2), 323-329.

45.Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.

46.Kim, E. H., (1978). A mean-variance theory of optimal capital structure and corporate debt capacity. The Journal of Finance, 33(1), 45-64.

47.Kim, I. (2015). Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance and Opportunism in Accounting Choice, Accounting & Taxation, 7(1), 51-65.

48.Lin KH & Hsu TH (2020). Based on Enhance the Corporate Governance - Exploration of Directors’ and Officers’(D&O) Liability Insurance Development in Taiwan, Journal of Insurance and Financial Management , 4(2), 43-53.

49.La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999). The quality of government. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15(1), 222-279.

50.La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2002). Investor protection and corporate valuation. The Journal of Finance, 57(3), 1147-1170.

51.Lang, L. H., Stulz, R., & Walkling, R. A. (1991). A test of the free cash flow hypothesis: The case of bidder returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 29(2), 315-335.

52.Leland, H. E., (1994). Corporate debt value, bond covenants, and optimal capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 49(4), 1213-1252.

53.Li, K. F., & Liao, Y. P., (2014). Director’ and Officer’ Liability Insurance and Investment Efficiency: Evidence from Taiwan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 29, 18-34.

54.Lin, C., Officer, M. S., & Zou, H., (2011). Director’ and Officer’ Liability Insurance and Acquisition Outcomes. Journal of Financial Economics, 102, 507-525.

55.Long, B. S., & Driscoll, C. (2008). Codes of ethics and the pursuit of organizational legitimacy: Theoretical and empirical contributions. Journal of Business Ethics, 77(2), 173-189.

56.Mayers, D. and C. Smith (1982). On the Corporate Demand for Insurance. Journal of Business, 55, 281-296.

57.McConnell, J. J., & Muscarella, C. J. (1985). Corporate capital expenditure decisions and the market value of the firm. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(3), 399-422.

58.Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340-363.

59.Miller, K. D., & Bromiley, P. (1990). Strategic risk and corporate performance: An analysis of alternative risk measures. Academy of Management Journal, 33(4), 756-779.

60.Mizruchi, M. S. (1996). What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of research on interlocking directorates. Annual Review of Sociology, 22(1), 271-298.

61.Norden, L., & Weber, M. (2004). Informational efficiency of credit default swap and stock markets: The impact of credit rating announcements. Journal of Banking & Finance, 28(11), 2813-2843.

62.O’Sullivan, N. (2002). The Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance by Large UK Companies. European Management Journal, 20, 574-583.

63.Peress, J. (2010). Product market competition, insider trading, and stock market efficiency. The Journal of Finance, 65(1), 1-43.

64.Peteraf, M., & Reed, R. (2007). Managerial discretion and internal alignment under regulatory constraints and change. Strategic Management Journal, 28, 1089-1112.

65.Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organisations : A Resource Dependence Perspective. New York, 175.

66.Phillips, R. A., Berman, S. L., Johnson-Cramer, M. E., & Elms, H. (2007). Stakeholder theory and managerial discretion. Academy of Management Proceeding, 2007, 1-6.

67.Ritter, J. R. (1991). The long-run performance of initial public offerings. The Journal of Finance, 46(1), 3-27.

68.Romano., R., (1990). Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis. Emory Law Journal, 39, pp. 1911.

69.Singh, J. V., Tucker, D. J., & House, R. J. (1986). Organizational legitimacy and the liability of newness. Administrative Science Quarterly, 31, 171-193.

70.Stulz, R. M. (1990). Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 26(1), 3-27.

71.Stulz, R. M. (2005), The limits of financial globalization. The Journal of Finance, 60(4), 1595-1638.

72.Subramanyam, K. R. (1996). The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22, 249-281.

73.Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571-610.

74.Tang LF, Liao HM, Lee JZ (2015). The Relationship between 'Directors' and 'Officers' Liability Insurance and Financial Statement Restatements. Taiwan Economic Review, 43(4), 549-588.

75.Wang MJ, Su XQ, Wang HD, Chen YS (2017). Directors' education and corporate liquidity: evidence from boards in Taiwan. Review of Quantitative Finance & Accountin, 49(2):463-485.

76.Wang, H., & Davidson, W. N. (2009). CEO age and managerial discretion: Evidence from CEO succession. Journal of Academy of Business and Economics, 9(4), 149-165.

77.Wynn, Jinyoung Park (2008). Legal Liability Coverage and Voluntary Disclosure. Accounting Review, 83, 1639-1669.

78.Su XQ, Lin YC, Chen CM and Alpha Lowe (2019). Are educational managers credible or overconfident? Evidence from share repurchases in Taiwan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 56(C), 93-112.