臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究調查集團企業的股權結構安排與集團內部資金使用之關聯性。 本文預測金字塔結構中的集團企業因具備內部資金融通優勢而傾向於使用更多的關係人借貸。 使用來自台灣公司的樣本，這項研究的結果部分支持吾人預期。 具體而言，本文雖未發現金字塔結構企業較非金字塔結構企業使用更多內部資金，然而本文實證結果指出，在金字塔企業之樣本中，越下層的公司使用越多關係人借貸。 這意味著金字塔底層企業從上層企業獲得更多內部資金。

關鍵詞：集團企業，金字塔結構，金字塔層，內部資本市場。

This study investigates if the firm arrangement in a business group will affect the use of internal fund within the group firms. The prediction in this paper is that group affiliates placed in the pyramidal structure tend to use more internal fund. In specific, the pyramidal firms use more internal fund compared with their non-pyramidal counterparts. Using the sample from Taiwanese firms, the prediction is not supported. However further evidence shows the pyramidal firm layer determines the demand for internal fund. The evidence implies the low-stream firms receive more internal fund from the up-stream firms

Keywords: business group, pyramidal structure, pyramidal layer, internal capital market.

Contents
摘要 i
Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iii
List of Table vii
List of Figure viii
Chapter 1. Introduction 1
1.1 Research Background 1
1.2 Research Objectives 3
1.3 Structure of this thesis 4
Chapter 2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 5
2.1 The Characteristics of Business Groups and Pyramidal Structure Firms 5
2.2 Internal Fund versus External Fund under Pyramidal Structure 7
2.3 Pyramidal Layers and Internal Fund 8
Chapter 3. Data and Methodology 9
3.1 Data and Sample Selection 9
3.2 Measures of Main Variables 10
3.2.1 Business Group 10
3.2.2 Pyramidal Structure 10
3.2.3 Internal Fund 11
3.2.4 Pyramidal Layer 12
3.3 Empirical Model 12
Chapter 4. Empirical Results 16
4.1 Pyramidal Structure Affects the Use of Internal Fund 16
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 16
4.1.2 Regression Analysis 20
4.2 Pyramidal Layer Affects the Use of Internal Fund 22
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 22
4.2.2 Regression Analysis 26
Chapter 5. Conclusion 28
References 29

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