依據Hsu, Novoselov and Wang (2018)之研究，具過度自信傾向的高階經理人較一般經理人更有意願發起有潛力獲利的投資計畫，並熱衷於解決計畫過程中發生的問題，但若計畫遭遇障礙，具過度自信傾向的經理人往往會推延對壞消息的回應，未能及時地處理問題可能導致公司的價值遭受損害。會計穩健性恰恰彌補了這項缺點，透過加速對壞消息的認列，而將訊息提前傳遞給其他管理高層、董事會成員等相關利害關係人(Stakeholders)。這些利害關係人在得知投資結果不如預期的訊息後，很有可能提前對壞消息做出回應，例如機構投資人可能會開始出售公司股票，董事會可能會要求經理人回應，因而迫使經理人須提前承認投資績效不如預期並採取改善措施。因此過度自信的經理人與會計穩健性的聯合效果應使公司呈現更好的績效。
本研究使用台灣上市、櫃公司樣本，特別關注經理人具有過度自信傾向並且呈現會計穩健性特質的公司，探討在這兩種特性的交互作用之下，是否會使公司呈現較好的未來績效。為進一步證實會計穩健性對過度自信經理人的正面效果，本研究進一步探討在面臨不同環境不確定性的情況下，經理人過度自信與會計穩健性的聯合效果對公司未來績效的正向影響，是否會因環境的不確定性而有所不同；以及企業在受到融資限制的情況下，經理人過度自信與會計穩健性的聯合效果，是否依然能夠改善公司的未來績效？
研究結果顯示(1)在2007至2016年台灣上市櫃公司資料中，經理人過度自信與會計穩健性的聯合效果確實會影響公司未來績效；(2)面臨高度經營環境不確定性的企業，經理人過度自信與會計穩健性的聯合效果對公司未來績效的正向影響，相較於低度環境不確定性的情況來得更為顯著；(3)在受到融資限制的情況下，經理人過度自信與會計穩健性的聯合效果呈現不顯著的結果；但是，在沒有受到融資限制的樣本中，交乘項則依然對公司未來績效具有正向的顯著影響。代表會計穩健性確實能彌補經理人過度自信的缺點，使經理人及早承認問題並採取改善措施，且環境不確定性凸顯了改善措施的價值，而財務自由度的不足，確實限制了改善措施的進行。

According to the research of Hsu, Novoselov and Wang (2018), in comparison to other executives managers who have a tendency of overconfidence are more willing to initiate promising investment projects, and to tackle problems that occur during the process.But overconfident managers tend to defer responding bad news when the work on the project hits a snag. Failure to deal with problems in a timely manner may damage the value of the firm. Accounting conservatism just makes up this shortcoming. By accelerating the recognition of bad news and immediately transmitting some messages to other executives and board members, accounting conservatism makes these stakeholders more likely to take a fair view and respond to bad news timely. So the overconfident managers are more likely to recognize problems earlier and take improvement actions. Therefore, the interactive effect of overconfident managers and accounting conservatism should be positive on firm’s future performance.
This study uses data from Taiwan listed and OTC companies, by focusing on firms with both characteristics , overconfident managers and accounting conservatism. This study investigates the interactive effects of overconfidence managers and accounting conservatism on firm’s future performance. Other objectives of this research are listed below:(1) Whether the positive interactive effect of overconfident managers and accounting conservatism on the firm's future performance will be different when facing different situation of environmental uncertainties; (2) Under the constraints of financing resources, will the interactive effect of overconfident managers and accounting conservatism still significantly affect the firm's future performance?
Our empirical results of this study are summarized as follows: (1)With the sample of Taiwan listed and OTC companies from 2007 to 2016, interactive effect of overconfident managers and accounting conservatism did significantly affect the firm's future performance. This is consistent with the findings of Hsu, Novoselov and Wang (2018); (2) In the case of a high environmental uncertainty, the positive interactive effect of overconfident managers and accounting conservatism on the firm's future performance is more stronger than the situation of lower environmental uncertainty; (3) Under the constraints of financing, the interactive effect of overconfident managers and accounting conservatism is insignificant; in the sample without financing restrictions, the interactive effect still have a significant positive impact on the firm's future performance.

摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
致謝 iv
目錄 v
表目錄 vii
圖目錄 viii
壹、緒論 1
一、研究背景及動機 1
二、研究問題 2
三、論文架構 3
貳、文獻探討與假說發展 5
一、經理人過度自信之探討 5
二、會計穩健性之探討 6
三、環境不確定性 6
四、融資限制 7
參、研究設計 9
一、實證模型之建立與變數之衡量 9
(一)實證模型之建立 9
(二)變數衡量之操作性定義 9
二、樣本選取與資料來源 10
肆、實證結果 12
一、敘述性統計量 12
二、相關係數 13
三、實證結果分析 15
(一)檢驗H1之假說 15
(二)檢驗H2之假說 17
(三)檢驗H3之假說 18
四、穩健性測試 19
伍、研究結論、建議及限制 26
一、研究結論 26
二、研究建議及限制 26
參考文獻 27
一、中文部分 27
二、外文部分 28

表目錄
表 1觀察值篩選過程 10
表 2敘述性統計量(樣本數=2360) 12
表 3 Spearman相關係數分析(樣本數=2360) 13
表 4 VIF之檢定 14
表 5 H1之實證結果 16
表 6 H2之實證結果 17
表 7 H3之實證結果 18
表 8以營收淨額平減應變數之敘述性統計量(樣本數=1970) 20
表 9 以營收淨額平減應變數之Spearman相關係分析(樣本數=1970) 21
表 10以營收淨額平減應變數之VIF之檢定 22
表 11以營收淨額平減應變數之實證結果 22
表 12以員工人數平減應變數之敘述性統計量(樣本數=2139) 23
表 13以員工人數平減應變數之Spearman相關係分析(樣本數=2139) 24
表 14以員工人數平減應變數之VIF之檢定 25
表 15以員工人數平減應變數之實證結果 25

圖目錄
圖 1研究流程圖 4

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