臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以 2012 年到 2022 年台灣上市櫃公司樣本，研究兩個重要的議題:第一是公司 治理要素中的高階管理階層之薪酬多寡，是否會影響其做出應計基礎及實質之盈餘管理，其原 因為高階管理階層為了績效佳進而提高薪酬之自利行為。其二為探討在 COVID-19 疫情期間， 普遍經濟蕭條的情況下，高階管理階層是否會做出盈餘管理之行為來美化財報。又高階管理階 層是否因為 COVID-19 疫情期間要獲得 COVID-19 疫情前之同等薪酬甚至更多薪酬，而有動機 做出盈餘管理之行為。
本研究實證結果為在 COVID-19 疫情期間，高階管理階層確實會做出三種實質盈餘管理行 為;進而在 COVID-19 疫情期間考量薪酬後，應計基礎之盈餘管理、實質盈餘管理中異常生產 成本以及實質盈餘管理中異常裁決性費用皆為正向顯著，顯示在 COVID-19 疫情期間，薪酬越 高越會影響高階管理階層做出盈餘管理之行為。

This paper examines two important issues using a sample of publicly listed companies in Taiwan from 2012 to 2022. The study first examines whether or not the executive compensation, as a corporate governance element, influences their engagement in accrual-based and real earnings management, driven by their self- interested behavior to enhance performance and increase executive compensation. Secondly, this study explores whether managers engage in earnings management to embellish financial reports during the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and whether they are motivated to do so to secure the same or even higher compensation levels as before the pandemic.
The empirical results of this study indicate that managers are found to engage in three types of real earnings management during the COVID-19 pandemic period. Furthermore, considering executive compensation during the pandemic, the paper finds that accrual-based earnings management, abnormal production costs in real earnings management, and abnormal discretionary expenses in real earnings management are all significantly positively correlated, indicating that higher compensation during the pandemic period increases the likelihood of earnings management by top management.

第一章、 緒論
第一節、研究背景與動機
第二節 研究目的
第二章、文獻回顧
第一節、代理理論與高階管理階層薪酬
第二節、盈餘管理文獻
第三節、COVID-19 文獻
第三章、研究設計與發展
第一節、研究設計
第二節、變數定義與衡量
(一)、應變數-應計盈餘管理
(二)、應變數-實質盈餘管理
1.異常營業活動現金流量(Abn_CFO)
2.異常生產成本(Abn_PROD)
3.異常裁決性費用(Abn_DISEXP)
(三)、自變數
(四)、控制變數
第四章、實證結果
第一節:樣本選取與資料來源
一、樣本選取
二、敘述性統計
第二節、相關係數分析
第三節、迴歸分析
第四節、敏感性測試
第五章、結論與建議
第一節、研究結論
第二節、研究限制及建議

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