臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文探討公司經理人過度自信及資訊透明度對避稅積極度之影響。首先確定經理人過度自信與避稅積極度之關聯，接著確定資訊透明度與避稅積極度之關係，最後證明過度自信之經理人是否透過資訊透明度之變化，製造避稅空間，以便其積極避稅。
本研究透過財報資訊判斷經理人是否具過度自信之特質；以分析師預測誤差作為衡量公司資訊透明度之依據；以會計有效稅率、現金有效稅率及透過產業平均有效稅率與公司有效稅率之差所得出之結果，包括會計避稅積極度及現金避稅積極度，四者分別作為本研究對積極避稅之衡量。
實證結果指出，過度自信之經理人可能因考慮稅務規劃所引發之成本，不一定會採取較積極的避稅措施，而資訊透明度與避稅積極度之關係也得到證據顯示透明度越低則有效稅率越低，避稅積極度則越高，反之亦然，最後將兩者結合成為第三個假說，公司經理人若具備過度樂觀特質，將透過降低公司透明度，藉此進行更多避稅活動，最後實證結果符合假說，即過度自信之經理人透過資訊透明度之變化，製造避稅空間，以便積極避稅。

This article explores the impact of manager’s over-confidence and corporate transparency on tax aggressiveness. First, analyses the relevance between manager’s over-confidence and tax aggressiveness. Then make sure the relevance between corporate transparency and tax aggressiveness. Final, prove that managers with over-confidence make opportunities to avoid tax.
This study used financial information to judge if managers are over-confidence. Used GAAP Effective Tax Rate(GAAP_ETR), Cash Effective Tax Rate(CASH_ETR) and the difference between average ETR of specific industries and ETR of companies in specific industry, called TA_GAAP and TA_CASH, to measure the tax aggressiveness in this study.
The empirical results show that managers with over-confidence are less likely to engage positive tax policies because of the huge cost of tax planning. Corporate transparency and tax aggressiveness are proved to be negative correlations. Final, this study combine hypothesis 1 and 2 into hypothesis 3. The empirical result of hypothesis 3 is conform to the expect of hypothesis 3.

目　錄
摘　要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌　謝 iii
目　錄 iv
表 目 錄 v
壹、緒論 1
一、研究背景與研究目的 1
二、論文架構 4
貳、文獻探討及假說發展 5
一、文獻回顧 5
二、假說發展 13
參、研究設計 14
一、樣本與資料來源 14
二、實證模型 15
三、衡量避稅積極度 18
四、衡量過度自信 20
五、衡量公司透明度 22
六、衡量控制變數 23
肆、實證結果與分析 24
一、敘述性統計 24
二、相關係數分析 27
三、迴歸分析結果 30
伍、結論與建議 38
一、總結 38
二、研究建議 38
參考文獻 39
一、英文文獻 39
二、中文文獻 46



表 目 錄
表1、敘述性統計表-CT1 25
表2、敘述性統計表-CT2 26
表3、皮爾森相關係數表 28
表4、迴歸分析表-自變數過度自信對應變數有效稅率及避稅積極度 31
表5、迴歸分析表-自變數資訊透明度對應變數有效稅率及避稅積極度 33
表6、迴歸分析表-自變數過度自信、資訊透明度及交乘項對有效稅率 35
表7、迴歸分析表-自變數過度自信、資訊透明度及交乘項對避稅積極度 37

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