在公司資訊揭露議題上，法人說明會已逐漸成為主要的揭露方式之一，同時，根據國內外相關文獻亦證實法人說明會為一具有資訊內涵之事件，然而，就國內而言，有關公司特性與法人說明會資訊內涵之關聯性並未獲得一致性之結論。
本文以公司規模、機構法人持股比例、及法人說明會召開頻率為法人說明會召開公司特性之替代變數，並據以調查上列替代變數與法人說明會資訊內涵之關聯性，樣本包括自民國88年迄92年8月底止由562間公司所召開之986次法人說明會。
本文使用事件研究法觀察法人說明會期間異常盈餘的變化，以驗證公司特性與法人說明會資訊內涵之關聯性，結果顯示法人說明會之資訊內涵與上述替代變數間確實具有關聯性，同時在法人說明會期間內，異常盈餘之變動與公司資本額大小、機構法人持股比例高低、及法人說明會召開頻率高低呈現反向變動趨勢，與本文預期公司規模愈大、機構法人持股愈高、法人說明會召開次數愈頻繁，則相關法人說明會之資訊內涵越低之假設相符合。

The conference call has become one of the most popular corporate disclosure method, and been proved to be with informative content. However, the co-relationship between the corporate characteristics and the information content of the conference calls is uncertain.
In this study we use the firm size, institutional investor’s ownership, and frequency of the conference calls as the proxies of the characteristics of the conference call firms and investigate the co-relationship between the proxies and the information content of the conference calls. The sample contains 986 conference calls during 1999 to August 2004 made by 562 listed companies in Taiwan.
To address the co-relationship, we use event study and examine the abnormal return during conference call period. We find evidence that the information content of the conference calls is related to the above proxies and document the variance of the abnormal return during the conference call period is inversely associated with the volume of the equity capital, the holding ratio of the institutional ownership, and the frequency of the conference calls been made in one year, consistent with our expectations that the large the conference call firms, the more the institutional ownership ,and the higher the frequency of the conference calls, response with the lower information content.

第一章 緒論
第一節 研究背景及動機………………………………..………… 1
第二節 研究問題…………………………………………..……… 5
第三節 研究貢獻…………………………………………..……… 6
第四節 研究流程…………………………………………..……… 7
第五節 論文架構…………………………………………..……… 8
第二章 文獻回顧
第一節 國內法人說明會之相關文獻……………………..……… 9
第二節 國外法人說明會之相關文獻…….……………………… 11
第三章研究方法
第一節 研究假說…………………………………………………… 18
第二節 研究設計…………………………………………………… 23
第三節 樣本描述…………………………………………………… 28
第四章 實證結果與分析
第一節 法人說明會之實證結果與分析…………………….……. 33
第二節 公司特性與法人說明會資訊內涵關聯性之實證結果與分析 35
第五章 結論與建議
第一節 研究結論…………………………………………………… 56
第二節 研究建議……………………………………………….…… 59
第三節 研究限制…………………………………………….……… 60
參考文獻……………………………………………………………… 61

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