臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文主旨在探討權益市值高估情形是否會影響公司進行實質盈餘管理行為，以及設置審計委員會能否對前述公司權益市值高估與實質盈餘管理之關聯性產生抑制效果。研究樣本選自2008年至2014年間國內上市櫃公司。實證結果發現，權益市值高估變數與實質盈餘管理呈顯著正相關，顯示權益市值高估之公司，較積極的進行實質盈餘管理。研究結果亦發現，審計委員會的設置並不會對權益市值高估公司進行實質盈餘管理的行為產生抑制效果。

This study investigates the effect of overvalued equity (OVE) on managers’ real activities manipulate behavior. We also examine the influence of audit committees on the aforementioned relationship between overvalued equity and real earnings management (REM). Data were collected from Taiwanese publicly traded firms on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Gre Tai Securities Market between 2008 and 2014. The empirical results show that there is a positive and significant association between OVE and REM. That is, those overvalued companies are more likely to use real earnings management. However, we couldn’t find any evidence on the design of audit committees to mitigate the relationship between overvalued equity and real earnings management.

第壹章 緒 論
第一節 研究背景與動機
第二節 研究目的
第三節 論文架構及流程

第貳章 文獻探討與假說建立
第一節 權益市值高估和實質盈餘管理間之關聯
第二節 審計委員會之設置對權益市值高估和實質盈餘管理間之關聯的影響
第三節 研究假說發展

第叁章 研究方法
第一節 樣本與資料來源
第二節 變數說明
第三節 實證模型

第肆章 實證結果與分析

第伍章 結論與建議

一、中文部分
王蘭芬、張瑀珊與薛敏正，2011，權益市值高估與代理成本間之關聯性，當代會計，第12卷第2期：169-190。
姜家訓，2009，權益誘因、盈餘管理與經理人持股變動之關係－權益市值高估代理成本之實證分析，臺大管理論叢，第19卷第S2期：1-34。
葉銀華與林志豪，2014， 上市櫃公司要設置審計委員會？ 審計委員會與盈餘管理之研究，輔仁管理評論，第21卷第3期：1-22。
楊朝旭、蔡柳卿、陳家慧與廖思婷，2012，董事會特性與實質盈餘管理，臺大管理論叢，第23卷第1期：363-399。
鄭桂蕙、蕭莉芃與薛敏正，2015，權益價值高估對具品牌聲譽會計師事務所之選擇與審計公費之影響，當代會計，第16卷第1期：33-63。
戴怡蕙，2015， 限制員工權利新股、董事委員會與實質盈餘管理：以台灣上市櫃公司為例，當代會計，第16卷第1期：1-31。

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