過去文獻指出或發現經理人持有內部負債(退休金與遞延薪酬)會使經理人變得保守與風險趨避，本研究探討經理人持有內部負債與過度自信的關係，過度自信經理人由於高估現金流量與低估風險會有過度投資行為，本研究探討內部負債的持有是否可以有效地修正過度自信經理人的投資行為。研究結果發現，內部負債的持有並不會有效的降低過度自信經理人的資本支出和公司風險；在研發投資方面，雖然研發投資具高度風險，但持有內部負債仍然不會使得過度自信經理人變得更為謹慎，並且減少研發費用的投入。總結上述，我們發現內部負債持有並無法有效地改善過度自信經理人的決策行為。因此，過去相關文獻當中內部負債對於減少經理人投資及降低風險的效果只存在於非過度自信經理人。

Prior literature suggests that CEOs with inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) would exhibit conservative and lower risk-taking behavior. This study investigates the relation between CEO inside debt holdings and overconfidence. Overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate future cash flow of investment project and underestimate project risk, leading to overinvestment. This study examines whether inside debt holdings improve investment decision made by overconfident CEOs. The empirical results show that inside debt holdings have no significant impacts on overconfident CEOs’ capital expenditure decisions as well as firm risks. In addition, although research and development expenditures investment are risky and invisible, inside debt holdings would not cause CEOs become more cautious and reduce research and development expenditures. To sum up, we find that inside debt holdings would not improves decision making by overconfident CEOs. Consequently, prior literature about inside debt holding reduced investment level and risk only exsit on nonoverconfident CEOs.

目錄
謝　詞 I
中文摘要 II
英文摘要 III
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻探討與研究假說 5
第一節 過度自信相關文獻 5
第二節 內部負債相關文獻 9
第三節 假說建立 11
第三章 研究設計 14
第一節 研究樣本與資料 14
第二節 變數定義 14
第三節 實證模型 18
第四章 實證結果 23
第一節 敘述統計量 23
第二節 迴歸分析 24
第五章 結論 30
附錄一：變數定義 32
參考文獻 34
著作權聲明 49

表次
表一 敘述統計量 39
表二 相關係數 40
表三 內部負債、過度自信與資本投資 41
表四 內部負債、過度自信與固定資產成長率 42
表五 內部負債、過度自信與總資產成長率 43
表六 內部負債、過度自信與系統風險 44
表七 內部負債、過度自信與公司特有風險 45
表八 內部負債、過度自信與股票報酬波動性 46
表九 內部負債、過度自信與公司部門別個數 47
表十 內部負債、過度自信與研究發展費用成長率 48

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