臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文主要探討為何企業會做災難捐款？是支持訊號假說亦或是名聲假說。本文分析企業災難捐款是因為過去賺錢或未來賺錢，還是只是因為要提高公司的名聲及盡社會責任而已。訊號假說認為企業災難捐款的動機是因為未來會賺錢，所以現在有能力且願意捐款，所以捐款的行為在暗示公司未來是會獲利的。名聲假說則認為企業災難捐款的動機是因為過去已賺錢但未來不會賺錢，亦或是只為提高公司名聲及盡社會責任而已。本文利用三種不同盈餘的定義來驗證這兩個假說何者被支持。本文透過事件研究法，將樣本分成實驗組(有捐款公司)及對照組(無捐款公司)來做分析，資料期間為2007第四季至2011第三季。本文的實證結果發現(1)有捐款的公司不管是在捐款前或捐款後都明顯比無捐款公司還要賺錢，此結果支持訊號假說的論點。(2)另外，透過廻歸分析，分為全期間、捐款前、捐款後，本文發現在控制公司的相關特有特徵後，常數項仍是顯著異於零。而在控制公司特有特徵後，有捐款公司不見得比無捐款公司來的賺錢，則是支持名聲假說。整體來說，本文的結果支持名聲假說，因為這五個公司特有特徵變數已經充分解釋有捐款公司為何賺錢。

Why corporation willing to do disaster donation? This study tries to differentiate between the information signaling and reputation hypotheses in terms of corporate disaster donation. Information signaling hypothesis indicates that corporations do disaster donation because they tend to earn higher revenue in the future. Thus, they possess higher ability and are willing to donate. In contrast, reputation hypothesis presents a different idea which indicates that corporations tend to have higher past profits and/or less future profits so that they do disaster donation just for the motivations of reputation or social responsibility. By adopting event study methodology, this study examine which one of information signaling or reputation hypotheses is supported in terms of three distinct earning measurements from 2007 Q4 to 2011 Q3. The results of earning difference mean (median) tests indicate that the information signaling hypothesis is supported not only for full sample analysis but also for subsamples analysis. However, the regression results, after controlling 5 firm’s specific characteristics, indicate that the reputation hypothesis is supported. It indicates that these 5 firm’s specific characteristics have completely explained why firm intends to donate in the case of disaster.

目 錄
摘要 I
Abstract II
目 錄 IV
第一章　簡 介 1
第二章　假 說 5
第三章　研究方法 7
第四章　樣本資料 9
第五章　實證結果 10
第一節　捐款日前及後的分析 10
第二節　公司特有特徵變數次樣本分析 11
第三節　異常盈餘迴歸分析 13
第六章　結　論 17
文獻參考 18
一、中文文獻 18
二、英文文獻 18

文獻參考
一、中文文獻
1.山立威、甘犁及鄭濤，2008，「公司捐款與經濟動機-基於四川地震後中國上市公司捐款的實證研究」，經濟研究，第11期，51-60。
2.陳小林，魏學強，2011，「企業捐款的動機、影響因素與經濟後果」，會計之友，第12期，7-10。
二、英文文獻
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