臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

「網路經濟」在現代經濟學上有其重要性與前瞻性，在實務上早已經開始運作，但理論上的支持文獻仍顯不足。本研究擬以「接續模型分析的一般化分析」與「ECPR管制分析」兩項理論模型為出發點，重新擴展廠商家數，並一般化既有文獻在「接續」議題的理論模型，並全新審視多重「繞道接續」所產生的問題，修正既有文獻僅能探討「直接接續」所產生的技術盲點，並援以適當的理論分析技術，提出「直接接續費」與「繞道接續費」的制定模式。本研究並分析「效率元件訂價法」應用在「接續費」訂定的適用性，以利於提供各國政府在制定「接續費」時的指引。首先，在「接續模型分析的一般化分析」的議題中，既有文獻僅能探討兩家或三家廠商之間的接續行為，對於探討複雜的網路經濟行為有其限制。本研究藉由擴展模型之後發現兩項主要的結論：(1.)本研究發現透過二、三與四家廠商其最適問題的比較，觀察其合理的繞道結構與接續費的均衡等變數，推測其間特殊的規律性，預測一般化可能的結果。(2.)藉由「效率元件訂價法」的應用，獲得該法則在網路經濟適用性之規則。這兩項研究發現將提供給政府在制定接續費管制上一項優良的方針，並在網路經濟的接續費議題中，獲得最新理論的基礎，並期廣泛應用在網路經濟上。

“Network Economics” with its importance and foresightedness in the modern economic has already started to operate in the practice, but literature to support this domain in theory is still obviously insufficient. This research employed two theoretical models, i.e.,“ the generalization of access model ” and “the analysis of ECPR regulation” as a starting point to do the following studies.
1.Expand the firm number for the generalization of theoretical model existed in the literature on the subject of “access”. 2.Examine carefully the problems raised from multiple “indirect access” and resolve the blind spot existed in the literature which only covers “direct access”. 3.Proposes suitable theoretical analysis technology for the formulation pattern in “direct access pricing” and “ bypass access princing”.
This research also analyzes the suitability of “Efficient Component Pricing Rule” applied to “access pricing”, which could be beneficial to offering guidelines for government''s leadership while making decision on “access pricing”. First, in “ An generalization of access model ”, the traditional literature only discusses between two or three firm access behaviors which has its limit regarding the discussion complex network economic activities. Once the model is extended, this research discovers two main conclusions: (1)By comparison of its optimum problem of two, three and four firm and observing its rational structure for a bypass-access way with access pricing in equilibrium, this research extrapolates the special regularity and forecasts the possible generalization results. (2)With the application of the “Efficient Component Pricing Rule “, one obtained the principle rule in the network economical serviceability. These two important discoveries will not only offer a fine policy for government to make decision on the access pricing regulation but also provide the foundation of the latest theory in access theme in network economics. Widespread application of our results in network economics could be expected.

第一章 緖論……………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機..………………………………………………..1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………………7
第三節 研究架構…………………………………………………………8
第二章 文獻回顧……………………………………………………………..10
第一節 網路經濟的其他相關文獻……………………………………..10
第二節 接續費之訂價方式的相關文獻探討…………………………..19
第三章 模型架構……………………………………………………………..28
第一節 模型基本架構與符號定義……………………………………..28
第二節 直接接續與效率元件訂價法則……………………………….41
第四章 命題與分析…………………………………………………………44
第五章 結論…………………………………………………………………50
附錄……………………………………………………………………………53
命題1 證明………………………………………………………………53
命題2 證明………………………………………………………………66
VII
參考文獻………………………………………………………………………94
VIII
圖目錄
圖一 甲廠商直接接續乙廠商…………………………………………………4
圖二 甲廠商繞道丙廠商接續至乙廠商………………………………………4
圖三 甲廠商繞道丁廠商接續至乙廠商………………………………………5
圖四 甲廠商繞道丙丁廠商接續至乙廠商……………………………………5
圖五 甲廠商繞道丁丙廠商接續至乙廠商……………………………………6
圖六 研究架構圖………………………………………………………………9
圖七 網路效應………………………………………………………………..15
圖八 正反饋現象……………………………………………………………..16
圖九 負反饋現象……………………………………………………………..17
圖十 單向接續模型…………………………………………………………..20
圖十一 雙向接續模型………………………………………………………..20
圖十二 ECPR 網絡示意圖…………………………………………………...25
圖十三 競爭者選擇進入市場之分析圖……………………………………..26
圖十四 區域廠商獨佔接續圖………………………………………………..28

中文部分
1.施俊吉 (2009)，「電信互連與接續互惠」，經濟論文叢刊，第37卷第一期，79-102頁。
2.吳大任與陳俊宏 (2007)，「網路經濟中的接續費訂價決策」，財務金融學刊，第15卷第4期，1-18頁。

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