為提升公司治理機制，保障股東權益及避免肥貓問題孳生，我國金融監督管理委員會（簡稱金管會）強制上市櫃公司於2011年底前完成薪酬委員會設置，期望能透過薪酬委員會第三方的監督機制，制定能強化高階經理人薪酬與公司經營績效之連結性、合理且透明之高階經理人薪酬制度。然而，薪酬委員會品質良窳將影響其監督效果。因此，本研究藉由探討薪酬委員會品質的高低是否對高階經理人薪酬與公司績效之關連性有所影響，並進一步探討自願設置薪酬委員會公司相較於非自願公司，對高階經理人薪酬與公司績效之關連性是否有所差異。
本研究以2011年及2012年為研究期間，排除金融業之台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，本研究使用薪資及現金紅利作為高階經理人薪酬之代理變數，在衡量薪酬委員會品質部分，以薪酬委員會規模、每年開會次數、委員出席率以及獨立董事比率等四項品質特性採主成份分析法建立綜合指標，並以兩階段估計方法（two-stage method）驗證薪酬委員會的品質對於高階經理人薪酬與公司績效關聯性之影響。研究結果發現，薪酬委員會品質越高，高階經理人薪酬與公司績效之關聯性越強；另外，自願設置薪酬委員會公司相較非自願公司，其高階經理人薪酬與公司績效連結性較強。

To promote corporate governance mechanisms and ensure stockholder's equity, Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) forced listed companies to set up the compensation committee before the end of 2011. Expecting to increase connection between top managers compensation and corporate performance and the rationality and transparency of top managers compensation through the third party supervisory mechanism of the compensation committee. However, the quality of the compensation committee will affect the result of supervisory. Therefore, the objective of this study is to examine if the quality of compensation committee will influence the association between top managers compensation and corporate performance. In addition, I will further investigate whether association between top managers compensation and corporate performance is different in companies that set up the compensation committee voluntarily (Type A companies) and companies set up it non-voluntarily (Type B companies).
For this study, I selected the publicly traded companies in the Taiwan Economic Journal’s (TEJ) database for the fiscal years 2011 to 2012. However, I excluded financial institutions, insurance companies, securities companies and holding companies because of their special industry characteristics and regulatory environments. This study used salary and cash bonus as a proxy for top managers compensation. Compensation committee quality is measured using four committee characteristics-the compensation committee size, the number of annual compensation committee meetings, members attendance rate, and the percentage of independent directors. I use two-stage method to examine the effect of compensation committee quality on the association between top managers compensation and corporate performance. The results indicate that the compensation committee quality strengthens the relationship between top managers compensation and corporate performance. The results also show that the compensation committee quality had a different impact on association between top managers compensation and corporate performance in companies that set up the compensation committee voluntarily and companies set up it non-voluntarily. Specifically, the results indicate that the relationship between top managers compensation and corporate performance is much stronger in Type A companies than in Type B companies under the same compensation committee quality

論要 i
ABSTACT ii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
圖目錄 v
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構 5
第二章 文獻探討與假說建立 7
第一節 高階經理人薪酬與公司績效之關聯性 7
第二節 薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人薪酬與公司績效關聯性 9
第三節 薪酬委員會品質對自願公司及非自願公司影響之差異 11
第三章 研究設計 13
第一節 研究樣本與資料來源 13
第二節 研究模型與變數說明 13
第四章　實證結果分析 24
第一節　敍述性統計 24
第二節　薪酬委員會品質對高階經理人薪酬與公司績效關聯性影響之實證結果 29
第三節　薪酬委員會品質對自願公司及非自願公司影響差異之實證結果 33
第四節　敏感性分析 35
第五章　結論與建議 44
第一節 研究結論 44
第二節 管理意涵 45
第三節 研究限制與未來研究建議 45
參考文獻 47

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