臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以2010-2012年有行使股東提案權的台灣上市(櫃)公司為研究對象，透過Tobin’s q及ROE為績效代理變數並以panel data模型進行實證研究，主要探討股東提案對公司經營績效之影響。研究結果顯示，機構投資人持股比例及董事薪酬對上市公司的經營績效為顯著負相關，公司治理指數與上櫃公司經營績效有顯著負相關，無論上市(櫃)公司，其董事會規模對公司經營績效為顯著負相關。

This study mainly investigates the impact of shareholder’s proposals on operation performance of companies, basing on the public listed companies of the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2010-2012, and we use Tobin’s q and ROE as the proxy of operation performance and panel data model to conduct the empirical study. The results indicates that the ownership of the institutional investor and the directors’ compensation have the significantly negative impact on operation performance of public listed companies, and G-index has the significantly negative impact on operation performance. Regardless of the company size, the board of directors has the significantly negative impact on operation performance.

摘 要 I
Abstract II
致 謝 III
目 錄 IV
表 次 VI
圖 次 VII
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 論文架構 5
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 公司經營績效相關文獻 6
第二節 股東提案相關文獻 10
第三節 股東提案簡介 14
第三章 研究方法 17
第一節 研究架構 17
第二節 研究假說 19
第三節 樣本選取與資料來源 22
第四節 變數定義 25
第五節 績效模型 31
第六節 Panel Data 模型 32
第四章 實證結果 36
第一節 基本統計量 36
第二節 Pearson 相關係數 43
第三節 最適模型檢定 45
第四節 panel data模型迴歸實證結果 47
第五章 結論與建議 55
第一節 結論 55
第二節 後續研究者的建議 57
參考文獻 58
一、中文文獻 58
二、英文文獻 59
附件一：上市公司股東提案資料 65
附件二：上櫃公司股東提案資料 66


表 次
表3-1 上市(櫃)公司行使股東提案權件數統計....................................... 23
表3-2 上市(櫃)公司行使股東提案權彙總表 .......................................... 23
表3-3 樣本公司產業資料 ........................................................................ 24
表3-4 變數操作性定義 ............................................................................ 30
表4-1 全樣本基本統計量 ........................................................................ 38
表4-2 上市公司基本統計量 .................................................................... 41
表4-3 上櫃公司基本統計量 .................................................................... 42
表4-4 Pearson 相關係數 ........................................................................ 44
表4-5 全樣本最適模型檢定 .................................................................... 45
表4-6 上市公司最適模型檢定 ................................................................ 46
表4-7 上櫃公司最適模型檢定 ................................................................ 46
表4-8 全樣本迴歸實證結果 .................................................................... 50
表4-9 上市(櫃)公司迴歸實證結果 .......................................................... 54


圖 次
圖 1-1 論文架構圖 ....................................................................................... 5
圖 2-1 股東提案程序表 ............................................................................. 15
圖 3-1 研究架構圖 ..................................................................................... 18
圖 3-2 樣本資料篩選流程圖 ..................................................................... 22
圖 3-3 最適模型檢定之流程圖 ................................................................. 35

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