臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在這個強調國際化發展的現代，公司規模越做越大，由全國性演變為全球性，為因應這樣的變化，公司將所有權與經營權分離，透過聘請具備相關專業知識的高階管理階層來為公司做出適當的決策，繳付較高的薪酬。但為解決代理問題，學者提出最適契約假說來減緩代理問題，而在最適契約假說理論下，透過適當的薪酬合約來改善代理問題，並透過薪酬制度的設置來影響高階經理人之行為，使高階經理人與股東間利益趨於一致，降低代理問題的發生，進一步透過競賽理論探討高階經理人之薪酬差異對公司績效的影響。薪酬差異可能會受到管理階層權力的影響，高階管理階層也可能影透過管理控制力響對企業決策，進而影響公司績效。因此本研究亦加入管理控制力，探討薪酬差異、管理控制力對企業績效之影響。
實證結果顯示支持競賽理論，高階經理人之薪酬對企業績效具有影響，但管理控制力對企業績效影響，除總經理任期與企業績效呈現負相關外，其他實證結果無法證實對企業經營績效有顯著相關。

In modern commercial world, the scale of a company is forced to be getting larger and larger to cope with economic globalization. Due to this complex tendency, the management right of a company is inevitably separated from its ownership. They thus have to employ top managers, who are well-qualified with potent professional knowledge and their distinguished work experience, to help the company make right decisions. To make the company run with success, the owner must offer high salary to attract top managers. Nevertheless, there consequently exists Agency Problem in the company. Seeing this, some scholars propose the application of Optimal Contraction Approach to mitigate the Agency Problem. From the Optimal Contraction Approach, a company must provide appropriate level of compensation contract to prevent Agency Problem from happening and to motivate top managers to expand efforts that meet stockholders’ value. Furthermore, by applying Tournament Theory, we research into the links between Managerial Compensation Contract and Firm Performance. From the theoretical perspectives, we wonder whether Compensation Differentials is influenced by managerial hierarchy, and whether top managers exert crucial influence, through their managerial power, on the company’s decisions and accordingly proceed to make an impact on Firm Performance. Therefore, Managerial Power factor is added in this study.

Empirical result shows positive standpoint toward Tournament Theory, which implies Managerial Compensation Contract exerts assured effect on Firm Performance. On the other hand, empirical result does not prove any positive significance regarding Managerial Power toward Firm Performance, except that there is significant negative relation between Manager’s Tenure and Firm Performance.

目　錄
中文摘要 I
英文摘要 II
致謝 III
目錄 IV
表目錄 Ⅴ
第壹章　緒論 1
第一節　研究動機與目的 1
第二節　論文架構 2
第貳章　文獻探討 3
第一節　最適契約假說 4
第二節　競賽理論 6
第三節 管理控制力 11
第參章　研究設計 15
第一節　研究假說建立與迴規模式 15
第二節　變數定義與衡量 17
第三節　研究期間、樣本選取與資料蒐集 23
第肆章　實證結果 25
第一節　敘述性統計分析 25
第二節　相關性分析 27
第三節　迴歸結果 30
第伍章　結論與建議 38
第一節　結論 38
第二節　研究限制 38
第三節　研究建議 39
參考文獻 41

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