臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在實務上早已有公營企業與民營企業共存的混合複占市場結構，但在理論上少有相關的分析，因此藉由本文的探討，可進一步了解公營企業與民營企業具完全互補特性時，其均衡的訂價決策為何。本文旨在探討依不同的訂價順序建構三種不同賽局的模型，在這三種不同的訂價順序下，混合複占市場裡的公營企業與民營企業之決策。根據模型推演與模擬結果發現，當公營企業的訂價未受到價格管制下限時，在產業中只要有一家企業為公營，可達成社會福利最大的條件；而當公營企業受到Ramsey訂價管制時，不論其訂價順序為何，在公營企業與民營企業存在一個完全互補性的產業，該產業的總利潤會達到最大。
當混合複占市場的公營企業受到公營企業必須自給自足的價格管制下，其與純粹複占市場相比較後，會發現當純粹複占和混合複占的市場結構下：(1)公營企業與民營企業的成本相同時，無論在公營企業與民營企業的訂價的順序為何(賽局A、B、C)，混合複占市場裡的總利潤、消費者剩餘和社會福利會比純粹複占的情況來得大。(2)當成本不同時，會因為系統產品的保留價格與系統產品的成本：(i)保留價格等於產業總成本時，會使混合複占市場的兩家廠商的總利潤、消費者效用和社會福利等於「純粹複占」時的情況。(ii) 在保留價格大於於產業總成本時，會使「混合複占」市場的總利潤、消費者剩餘及社會福利大於「純粹複占」市場的情況。(iii) 在保留價格小於產業總成本時，會使「純粹複占」市場的消費者剩餘大於「混合複占」市場；「混合複占」市場的總利潤及社會福利大於「純粹複占」市場。

Public and private enterprises have long coexisted in the mixed duopoly market structure. However, there is rarely any analysis based on the relevant theories. This study aims at understanding more in-depth details about the perfect complement between public and private enterprises as well as the balanced pricing decision. It will investigate different pricing sequences according to three different models to comprehend the full picture of the decisions made by public and private enterprises in the mixed duopoly market structure. In terms of the model inferences and the simulated results, it shows that when the pricing in public enterprise is not affected by the lower control limit and one of the enterprises in the industry is public enterprise, it can perform the best social welfare. On the other hand, when public enterprise is affected by Ramsey pricing regulations, the industry with the perfect complement characteristic in public or private enterprises can get the biggest profit no matter what the pricing sequence is.
When public enterprise is affected by the pricing regulations in the mixed duopoly market, the market structure of pure duopoly and mixed duopoly is as following after comparing with pure duopoly market: (1) When public and private enterprises have the same cost, the total profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare in the mixed duopoly will be bigger than in the pure duopoly no matter what the pricing sequence is (A,B,C). (2) When public and private enterprises have different cost, the reservation price of the system products and its cost will lead to the following situations: (i) When , the total profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare from the two enterprises in the mixed duopoly will be the same as in the pure duopoly. (ii) When , the total profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare in the mixed duopoly will be bigger than in the pure duopoly. (iii) When , consumer surplus in the pure duopoly will be bigger than in the mixed duopoly; total profit and social welfare in the mixed duopoly will be bigger than in the pure duopoly.

摘要……………………………………………………………………..I
Abstract………………………………………………………………III
誌謝……………………………………………………………………..V
目錄……………………………………………………………………VII
圖目錄…………………………………………………...……..……IX
第一章 緒論……………………………… …………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的………………………………………………………6
第三節 研究架構………………………………………………………8
第二章 文獻探討…………………………… ………………………10
第一節 具替代性之公營民營寡占之相關文獻…………………...10
第二節 完全互補性與公營民營混合寡占之相關文獻…….…23
第三節 其他相關文獻……………………………….…………30
第三章 模型架構……………………………….……………………33
第一節 模型基本架構與符號定義……………….……………33
第二節 完全互補性與公營民營混合複占之訂價法……...…37
第四章 命題與分析…………………………………………………40
第五章 結論…………………………………………………………50
參考文獻……………………….………………………………………53
附錄……………………..…………………………………………….58
圖一 研究架構 ………………………………………………………………9
圖二 賽局的標準式…………………………………………………………30
圖三 完全互補性混合複占市場之模型……………………………………35

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