論文主要討論在寡占市場的模型下，進行Stackelberg的數量競爭時。在考慮技術優勢廠商以收取單位權利金或從時採用單位權利金(royalty fee)與固定費用(fixed fee)授權下，何者能收取最大利益與造成教好的消費者剩餘或社會福利以及在有外溢效果的情況下，造成授權策略及社會福利的何種改變。
研究結果顯示，在技術優勢廠商授權時收取單位權利金能造成其最大利潤，但卻使消費者剩餘嚴重受損及社會福利下降。但在hybrids 授權策略下，不但同樣能使技術優勢廠商的利潤提高，而且能有條件地使社會福利能夠上升。在兩者策略的比較之下，我們發現在hybrids 授權策略下能得到較高的消費者勝瑜與社會福利，若政府為了關心消費者與社會福利，願意補貼技術優勢廠商在兩者授權改變策略下的利潤損失，則技術優勢廠商就願意採用hybrids 授權策略。
此外，在有外溢效果的情況下，技術優勢廠商仍採取授權策略時，若採用單位權利金的授權策略，會造成其被授權者的利潤受損，使得此授權契約不存在。但若此用固定費用授權下，則不但可是被授權者獲得利潤，也可改善消費者剩餘及社會福利，可謂一舉兩得。

In this paper, we explore and compare the different licensing strategy at normal situation or spillover effect. We found that in the Stackelberg competition, if the patent holder adopt the hybrids licensing strategy, which could improve consumer surplus and social welfare.
In the spillover effect , we show that the social welfare could improve if spillover effect existed. When the patent holder make a technology transfer to followers, the patent holder adopt fixed fee licensing which is better than royalty fee licensing , it will improve the consumer surplus and social welfare under Stackelberg competition.

Contents
Chapter1 Introduction 1
1.1 Research Motivation 1
1.2 Literature review 2
Chapter 2 Licensing under Stackelberg Competition 4
2.1Non-licensing 5
2.2 licensing on royalty fee 7
2.3 Hybrids licensing 12
2.3.1 Comparisons between hybrids-licensing and non-licensing 16
2.4 Comparison: Royalty fee licensing versus Hybrids licensing. 18
Chapter3 spillover effect 19
3.1 Overall spillover 20
3.1.1comparison between non-licensing, overall spillover effects and non-licensing, non-spillover effects: 22
3.2 Licensing to one firm with fixed fee 24
3.2.1 Comparison between licensing to one firm with fixed fee and non-licensing, non-spillover effects
3.3Licensing to one firm with royalty fee 28
3.3.1 Comparison between one royalty fee, one spillover effect and non-licensing, non-spillover effects: 31
3.4 Comparison between one royalty fee licensing and one fixed fee licensing 33
3.5 Comparison between royalty fee licensing and spillover effect 35
3.5.1 Overall royalty versus overall spillover 35
3.5.2 One fixed fee-one spillover effect versus overall spillover: 36
Chapter four : conclusion 37
Reference 40

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