臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

隨著全球都市化程度越來越高，都市與區域的競爭也越來越激烈，當中租稅競爭等都市發展策略，往往造成「Race to the bottom」的現象，因此近年來許多學者紛紛關心租稅競爭所引發的諸多財政問題。
本研究以Dembour and Wauthy（2009）的模型作為基礎，加入Martin and Rogers（1995）將基礎設施分類為在地型基礎設施 (domestic infrastructure)以及國際型基礎設施(international infrastructure)，來建構模型以了解其投資量與基礎建設類型之關聯性。透過廠商利潤函數與政府投資函數，計算其稅額與投資量的均衡解，並在均衡結果中，比較靜態分析出不同外溢效果下，基礎類型之投資量與稅額的變動情形，並以之為基礎了解基礎設施的投資量對於租稅競爭之影響。
最後，本研究加入基礎設施分類後發現當地方政府的決策方式不同時，外溢效果對於基礎設施的影響也會因為不同的賽局設定而有所不同，同時也會令租稅競爭有不同的結果，可能導致居民福祉的下降，或是「Free rider」坐享其成的地方政府。

As the level of urbanization become higher and higher, the competition between cities is more intense. The plan of development of city such as tax competition leads to a symptom called “Race to the bottom”. As a result, many scholars try their best to do the research of the financial problems that caused by tax competition.
This paper is based on the mold of Dembour and Wauthy（2009）, also added the mold of Martin and Rogers（1995）. In order to build the mold to understand the connection of inventory amount and basic construction, we will divide basic facility part into domestic infrastructure and international infrastructure. Through vendor profit function and government investment function, we can calculate the tax and the balance point of investment and by this process; we can compare different spillover effect to know the alteration of basic type investment and tax. Through this, we can understand how basic facility investment affects tax competition.
In conclusion, we find that when the local government has different plan, the influence of spillover effect, for basic construction, will be different. That will cause different result for tax competition and lead to the decrease of the profit or “Free Rider”, a government who sits idle and enjoy the fruits of others' work.

目錄 i
表目錄 3
圖目錄 3
第一章、緒論 3
一、研究動機 3
二、研究目的 3
第二章、研究設計 3
一、研究內容與方法 3
二、研究架構與流程 3
第三章、文獻回顧 3
一、空間競爭模型 3
二、基礎設施與租稅競爭理論 3
第四章、基礎設施投資與租稅競爭（一） 3
一、地方政府 3
二、廠商 3
三、均衡分析 3
四、比較靜態分析與延伸探討 3
第五章、基礎設施投資與租稅競爭（二） 3
一、先決定在地型基礎設施的賽局型態 3
二、比較靜態分析 3
第六章、結論與建議 3
一、結論 3
二、建議 3
參考文獻 3
一、英文文獻 3
二、中文文獻 3
表目錄
表3-1：Hotelling (1929)延伸應用之操作變數對比表 3
圖目錄
圖2-1：研究流程圖 3
圖3-1：Hotelling (1929)模型示意圖 3
圖3-2：d’Aspremont et al.(1979)削價競爭示意圖 3
圖3-3：運輸費率為concave型態的區位競爭 3
圖3-4：廠商對基礎設施類型的偏好 3
圖4-1：廠商對基礎設施類型的偏好 3
圖4-2：廠商最適位置(optimal location)的稅收組合圖 3

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二、中文文獻
吳世傑，曹古駒，林燕淑（2012）。都市發展類型、基礎設施投資及租稅競爭。都市與計畫，39(3)，247-266。
范淑敏、周志龍（2008）。台灣的地方發展策略：治理與網絡化。都市與計畫，35(2)，99-122。
黃崇哲（2011）。描繪都市核心產業發展：以台北為例。都市與計畫，38(2)，99-117。
黃鴻（1997）。Hotelling模型的回顧與展望。經濟論文叢刊（Taiwan Economic Review），25(2)，113-124。
賴孚權，姚仁德，余家銘，孫嘉宏（2011）。區域經濟學，台北市：翰蘆圖書。