臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

企業為了激勵員工除了基本的薪資外會給予額外獎勵，而主要分成現金與股票兩種。然而我國經濟部為了與國際接軌，於2008年1月1日實施員工分紅費用化，卻對我國科技產業造造成劇烈之衝擊，且在紅利與稅制的改變，影響了員工的實質所得，造成人才的流失，因此設計出有效之獎酬契約成為企業重要決策之一。本研究以委託代理理論中的「代理模型」，在員工分紅費用化後，於主理人與代理人雙方「資訊不對稱」下，設計最適之獎酬契約，發揮代理人最大之努力程度。本研究以股東期望財富極大化的方向來設計出綜合現金與股票之理論模型，探討最適基本薪資與最適獎酬。研究推論，員工分紅費用化後，員工最適獎酬契約之設計，主要受到員工的風險趨避係數、員工投入的成本係數，以及公司價值變異風險所影響，而在薪資契約方面，還需要額外考量員工資歷與工時，最後亦應參照同業間之紅利配股比例與薪資，以制訂出較為完善之獎酬契約。

The industry provided cash & stock to employees as an extra bonus to encourage them. On January 1st, 2008, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C implemented expensing of employee bonus in order to connect to the globalization. However, with the change of bonus recognition & tax system, this policy impacted employees’ income a lot. Thus, it is important for industry to create an effective bonus institution. This research is based on “agent model” in the principal-agent theory to design the Optimum Employees’ Reward Contract in which the principal & the agent both are under “asymmetric information” & after carrying out expensing employee bonus. This design would motivate the agent to behave their best efforts & achieve the maximization of corporate valuation. Therefore, in the direction of shareholder’s wealth maximization, the research devises a theoretical model integrating cash & employee stock bonus to analyze the optimization of employees’ minimum wage & incentive measure. The research infers that the design of the optimum of employees’ reward contract is principally decided by coefficients of employees’ risk aversion & input cost & the variation risk of corporate valuation after implementing expensing employee bonus. While making contract, the industry should consider employees’ work experience & work hours prudently. Besides, it is also necessary to compare with other companies in order to make sure the possible of setting up a better bonus contract.

目錄
目 錄 I
圖目錄 II
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景 3
第二節 研究動機 6
第三節 研究目的 7
第四節 研究架構與研究流程 8
第二章 文獻回顧 10
第一節員工分紅相關理論基礎 11
第二節員工分紅制度 13
第三節 員工分紅費用化 15
第四節員工分紅制度與經營績效之關聯性 19
第三章 基本模型與符號設定 27
第一節 模型背景假設與變數之建立 28
第二節 模型運算與推演 35
第四章 命題與分析 43
第五章 結論 52
參考文獻 56
圖目錄
圖一研究流程 9

參考文獻
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