所謂產業標準，除以其集體制定的特質引發競爭法討論之外，其中牽涉的專利技術更成為智慧財產權法與競爭法交集的重點所在，因為專利權所對應的私有、排他的概念在本質上即可能與講求普遍實施的產業標準發生衝突，進而有害市場競爭，且此種隱憂於標準必要專利（Standard Essential Patents, SEPs）之場合更形凸顯。正因如此，實務上標準制定組織（Standard Setting Organizations, SSOs）紛紛制定智財權政策（IP Policy），要求專利被納入標準的專利權人承諾按照「RAND」或「FRAND」的原則進行授權，亦即要求專利權人將標準所必要的專利技術以公平（Fair）、合理（Reasonable）、非歧視（Non-Discriminatory）的授權方式開放予欲採行標準的廣大利用人。
然而觀諸近年來一件又一件環繞RAND或FRAND而來的爭執，例如Apple、Microsoft與Motorola這些重量級廠商之間的專利戰爭，以及瑞昱、友訊等台灣業者於美國國際貿易委員會（ITC）或地方法院所涉入的司法爭訟，卻會發現起初用以化解矛盾的機制如今反成為問題的濫觴，縱使不是作繭自縛，這種授權承諾在實務運作上也已經陷入困境。尤其，不論RAND或FRAND，其制度設計之初乃著眼於專利權人與標準利用人間技術授權的順暢，但到頭來如何將基於此一制度而來的授權承諾具體化為標準必要專利之權利金，卻是難解的謎團。
職是之故，面對現行實務的運作困難，本文先對上述現象予以釐清之外，更聚焦有關RAND或FRAND權利金具體爭執的案件，綜述目前此類紛爭之解決模式，除從司法判決分析法院對於標準必要專利權利金決定方法的架構，並分別從程序面向與實體面向進一步檢視，探討專利聯盟與仲裁等紛爭解決管道之可行性，以及具體計算權利金之判斷重心，以尋求困境之突破。文末則提出具體結論與建議，期能藉有效的權利金判斷方式訴諸專利權人與標準利用人之平衡，將標準必要專利導回其運作常軌，業者於此國際趨勢下也能為妥善之因應與佈局，以最終發揮專利法與競爭法共同追求的增進消費者福利的最高宗旨。

Industrial development relies heavily on widely adopted technology standards due to their deep influence across the marketplace. Yet the so-called standards, which frequently invoke anti-trust issues in view of their collaborative setting process, further become a touchstone to the overlapping areas of anti-trust law and patent law because of those proprietary patented technologies involved in. Among the market concerns over potential conflict between the exclusive nature of patent rights and the disseminative feature of standards, the availability of standard essential patents (SEPs) can be deemed most controversial.
Accordingly, many Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) require owners of those SEPs to commit to offer licenses on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (F/RAND) terms, aiming to make it possible for manufacturers to gain access to those patented technologies and therefore implement the standard. However, recent lawsuits such as those filed between Apple, Microsoft and Motorola in the U.S. courts may demonstrate the deficiency and ineffectiveness of the existing policy. Even Taiwanese companies have raised questions with respect to, inter alia, the interpretation of the F/RAND commitments in terms of reasonable royalty rates, in some court cases as well. It is obvious that the F/RAND commitment required to address controversy has itself become one of the most disputed issues in the circumstances of SEPs licensing.
This thesis therefore not only discusses the issues mentioned above but also focuses on a couple of lawsuits associated with the practical interpretation of the F/RAND commitments. In addition to the analysis of the current problem-solving model and its subsequent cruxes, the following content proceeds to explore some possible methodologies in respect of both procedural and substantial fields in order to break the gridlock. Finally, conclusion and suggestion are proposed with the intention of providing effective and proper royalty determination of F/RAND-encumbered SEPs to balance patent owners and technology implementers in standard setting activities; hence justifying the mutual objective of anti-trust law and patent law, i.e. promoting consumer benefit.

第一章 緒論............................................................................................. 14

第一節 研究背景與動機.......................................................................................... 14
第二節 研究範圍、研究方法及研究限制............................................................ 18
第一項 研究範圍................................................................................................. 18
第二項 研究方法................................................................................................. 18
第三項 研究限制................................................................................................. 18
第三節 論文架構提要.............................................................................................. 20

第二章 標準必要專利與標準制定組織之智財權政策................... 21

第一節 產業標準與標準制定組織......................................................................... 21
第一項 產業標準之基本概念............................................................................. 21
第一款 產業標準之意義............................................................................. 21
第二款 相容性產業標準............................................................................. 22
第三款 標準對市場之作用......................................................................... 23
第二項 標準制定組織之基本概念..................................................................... 24
第一款 標準制定組織之角色..................................................................... 24
第二款 標準制定組織與競爭法................................................................. 25
第三項 通訊標準與標準制定組織..................................................................... 27
第一款 通訊產業與標準的密切關係......................................................... 27
第二款 通訊技術與產業概況..................................................................... 28
第三款 重要標準制定組織及其通訊標準................................................. 29
第二節 標準必要專利之意義與必要性................................................................ 31
第一項 專利之於標準制定之意義..................................................................... 31
第一款 產業標準與專利的互動關係......................................................... 31
第二款 標準制定的關鍵過程..................................................................... 32
第二項 專利必要性............................................................................................. 34
第一款 必要性定義..................................................................................... 34
第二款 必要性之爭..................................................................................... 36
第三節 標準制定組織之智財權政策.................................................................... 38
第一項 智財權政策之基本概念......................................................................... 38
第一款 智財權政策的產生：為何需要智財權政策？............................. 38
第二款 智財權政策的內容：揭露義務與授權義務................................. 39
第二項 著名標準制定組織之智財權政策......................................................... 41
第一款 ITU之智財權政策.......................................................................... 41
第二款 ETSI之智財權政策........................................................................ 42
第三款 IEEE之智財權政策........................................................................ 43
第四款 小結................................................................................................. 44

第三章 標準必要專利之困局——F/RAND制度及其衍生爭議.... 45

第一節 問題的濫觴——智財權政策之制度盲點............................................... 45
第一項 定義未明的智財權政策......................................................................... 45
第一款 F/RAND制度的廣泛使用.............................................................. 45
第二款 對於F/RAND的初始共識....................................................... 46
第二項 標準制定組織之消極立場..................................................................... 47
第一款 不介入聲明..................................................................................... 47
第二款 不介入之原因................................................................................. 48
第三項 F/RAND制度之下的實務爭議.............................................................. 49
第一款 從制度盲點到具體爭執................................................................. 49
第二款 實務現況......................................................................................... 50
第三款 權利金爭議之具體案例................................................................. 52
第二節 標準必要專利經典案例探討（一）——Microsoft v. Motorola.......... 58
第一項 案件背景................................................................................................. 58
第二項 爭點與主張............................................................................................. 58
第三項 法律分析與涵攝..................................................................................... 59
第一款 法理基礎......................................................................................... 59
第二款 RAND義務的解讀......................................................................... 60
第三款 合理權利金之計算方式................................................................. 65
第四項 法院判決結果與分析............................................................................. 69
第一款 系爭專利之合理權利金比率與範圍............................................. 69
第二款 陪審團決定..................................................................................... 70
第三款 小結................................................................................................. 72
第三節 標準必要專利經典案例探討（二）——In re Innovatio...................... 73
第一項 案件背景................................................................................................. 73
第二項 爭點與主張............................................................................................. 74
第一款 聚焦至RAND的訴訟內容............................................................ 74
第二款 審理順序與適用範圍..................................................................... 76
第三項 法律分析與涵攝..................................................................................... 77
第一款 專利必要性..................................................................................... 77
第二款 分析方法......................................................................................... 79
第三款 權利金計算基礎............................................................................. 82
第四款 系爭專利之重要性......................................................................... 82
第五款 可對比授權..................................................................................... 83
第六款 計算權利金比率的其他方法......................................................... 85
第四項 法院判決結果與分析............................................................................. 86
第一款 本案權利金判決............................................................................. 86
第二款 RAND權利金案件之比較............................................................. 86
第三款 小結................................................................................................. 87

第四章 標準必要專利權利金之具體化與解決途徑....................... 88

第一節 現行紛爭解決模式之探討......................................................................... 88
第一項 具體權利金紛爭之現行解決模式......................................................... 88
第一款 美國法院權利金判決現況綜覽................................................. 88
第二款 程序現況之特色：法院幾乎成為唯一決定機制......................... 90
第三款 實體現況之特色：架構於假設性協商的方法論......................... 92
第二項 現行紛爭解決模式之侷限..................................................................... 93
第一款 各項實體與程序困難..................................................................... 93
第二款 侷限之突破？................................................................................. 95
第二節 權利金具體化之可能途徑——程序面分析........................................... 96
第一項 借鏡專利聯盟作為F/RAND權利金決定管道..................................... 96
第一款 制度發想......................................................................................... 96
第二款 預期實益......................................................................................... 97
第三款 疑義探討......................................................................................... 98
第四款 制度模式之設計............................................................................. 101
第五款 小結................................................................................................. 103
第二項 設計仲裁途徑作為F/RAND紛爭解決管道......................................... 103
第一款 制度發想......................................................................................... 103
第二款 預期實益......................................................................................... 105
第三款 疑義探討......................................................................................... 107
第四款 制度模式之設計............................................................................. 110
第五款 小結................................................................................................. 113
第三節 權利金具體化之可能方法——實體面分析........................................... 114
第一項 F/RAND制度的再省思.......................................................................... 114
第一款 事前授權協商的不可行................................................................. 114
第二款 F/RAND制度乃必要的模糊.......................................................... 116
第二項 Georgia-Pacific分析模型於權利金決定之運用................................... 116
第一款 以假設性雙邊協商計算權利金數額............................................. 116
第二款 Georgia-Pacific分析模型之合用性？........................................... 117
第三項 增值判斷................................................................................................. 119
第一款 以事前增值為思維基礎................................................................. 119
第二款 增值判斷之缺陷............................................................................. 119
第三款 小結................................................................................................. 112
第四項 可對比判斷............................................................................................. 112
第一款 以市場比較為思維基礎................................................................. 112
第二款 可對比判斷的潛在陷阱................................................................. 123
第三款 可對比判斷之運用......................................................................... 124
第四款 小結................................................................................................. 126
第五項 專利箝制與權利金堆疊......................................................................... 127
第一款 專利箝制之於F/RAND承諾的具體化......................................... 127
第二款 權利金堆疊之於F/RAND承諾的具體化..................................... 130
第三款 小結................................................................................................. 132

第五章 標準必要專利之權利金決定與整體制度變革趨勢.......... 135

第一節 標準必要專利之權利金決定.................................................................... 135
第一項 決定標準必要專利權利金之程序設計——紛爭有效解決................. 135
第一款 紛爭處理程序有效串連的需求..................................................... 135
第二款 更加積極的標準制定組織............................................................. 137
第三款 完整串連的紛爭處理程序............................................................. 139
第二項 決定標準必要專利權利金之實體判斷——利益平衡......................... 142
第一款 假設事前情境的雙邊協商............................................................. 142
第二款 具體權利金落在平衡兩端的支點................................................. 143
第二節 標準必要專利之整體制度變革趨勢....................................................... 146
第一項 趨勢變革的動因..................................................................................... 146
第一款 權利金比率下降............................................................................. 146
第二款 禁制令取得不易............................................................................. 147
第二項 專利運用的可能動向............................................................................. 148
第一款 禁制令策略漸行邊緣化................................................................. 148
第二款 商業化策略改變............................................................................. 150

第六章 結論與建議............................................................................... 153

第一節 結論................................................................................................................ 153
第二節 建議................................................................................................................ 155
第一項 面對國際趨勢之攻防策略..................................................................... 155
第二項 專利佈局與運用..................................................................................... 157

參考文獻................................................................................................... 161
壹、中文文獻............................................................................................................. 161
貳、外文文獻............................................................................................................. 163
參、網路資料............................................................................................................. 174

壹、中文文獻

一、專書

• 周延鵬，《智慧財產權全球行銷獲利聖經》，天下雜誌，2010年1月第一版。
• 馮震宇，《鳥瞰21世紀智慧財產：從創新研發到保護運用》，元照出版，2011年5月初版。
• 馮震宇，《智慧財產權發展趨勢與重要問題研究》，元照出版，2011年1月第二版。
• 劉孔中，《智慧財產權運用與競爭秩序》，經濟部智慧財產局，2008年3月第三版。

二、論文與研究報告

• 中華經濟研究院（台灣WTO中心），〈國家標準涉及智慧財產權之研究〉執行成果報告書，97 年度國際經貿事務研究及培訓中心計畫子計畫一：專題研究（6），2008年12月。
• 國家實驗研究院，〈全球專利訴訟案件分析〉，通訊產業專利趨勢與專利訴訟分析研究計畫，經濟部智慧財產局一O二年度委託研究計畫，中華民國 102 年 12 月 31 日。
• 周相攸，〈技術標準中關鍵專利之專利權限制——以關鍵設施理論與誠信原則為中心〉，國立清華大學科技法律研究所碩士學位論文，2010年9月。
• 洪誠孝、陳柏青、林佳穎、王偉仲，〈中國數位電影標準發展之研究〉，政大智財所大陸論文發表，2009年12月。
• 徐弘光，〈台灣專利聯盟（Patent Pool）的可行性探討——以國際產業標準的營運模式為例〉，國立政治大學科技管理研究所碩士學位論文，2006年6月。
• 陳貞妤，〈技術標準制定與相關專利實施之競爭法問題探討〉，國立政治大學智慧財產研究所碩士學位論文，2008年1月。
• 馮震宇，〈從美國專利發明法變革探討對未來專利訴訟之影響（1/3）〉，行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫，2013年5月。
• 馮震宇，〈從美國專利發明法變革探討對未來專利訴訟之影響（2/3）〉，行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫，2014年5月。
• 劉孔中，《競爭法與智慧財產權法的衝突與調和》。
• 顏利真，〈標準必要專利之競爭法議題探討––以FRAND授權案件為中心〉，國立臺灣大學科際整合法律學研究所碩士學位論文，2013年6月。
• 羅紫庭，〈論專利授權契約之法律爭議——以產業標準之關鍵專利為核心〉，國立臺北大學法律學系碩士學位論文，2013年7月。

三、期刊文章

• 李素華，〈專利權行使與公平交易法——以近用技術標準之關鍵專利為中心〉，公平交易季刊，第 16 卷第 2 期，2008年4月。
• 李淑蓮，〈標準關鍵專利授權金之計算 ：何謂合理？——Part II台灣廠商的困境〉，北美智權報：http://www.naipo.com/Portals/1/web_tw/Knowledge_Center/Industry_Economy/publish-220.htm（最後瀏覽日：2014年5月28日）。
• 和育東，〈「專利叢林」問題與美國專利政策的轉折〉，2008年1月，《知識產權》第一期：http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=68735（最後瀏覽日：2014年5月27日）。
• 范曉玲，〈獨占與兼容：產業標準與專利池之反壟斷審查——從飛利浦案所涉聯合行為談起〉，萬國法律雜誌第145期，2006年2月。
• 張春飛，〈Wi-Fi技術的原理及未來發展趨勢〉，數字社區與智能家居，2008年11期。
• 馮震宇，〈運用智財策略強化競爭力〉，EMBA世界經理文摘，第334期，頁116-121。
• 馮震宇，〈美國專利救濟制度改革複審救濟程序效益顯現〉，科技產業資訊室：http://iknow.stpi.narl.org.tw/post/Read.aspx?PostID=9730（最後瀏覽日：2014年6月4日）。
• 葉雲卿，〈標準專利取得禁制令之限制——分析Google 標準專利與FTC的裁定〉，北美智權報：http://www.naipo.com/Portals/1/web_tw/Knowledge_Center/Infringement_Case/publish-53.htm（最後瀏覽日：2014年5月 2日）。
• 劉孔中，〈專利庫——經濟取向分析下之法制比較與調和〉，政大智慧財產評論，第10卷第1期，2012年6月。

貳、外文文獻

一、研究報告

• U.S. Dep't of Justice &; Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007). Available at: http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/antitrust-enforcement-and-intellectual-property-rights-promoting-innovation-and-competition-report.s.department-justice-and-federal-trade-commission/p040101promotinginnovationandcompetitionrpt0704.pdf.
• National Research Council, Patent Challenges for Standard-Setting in the Global Economy: Lessons from Information and Communication Technology. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2013, available at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18510.

二、期刊文章

• Brian Dean Abramson, The Patent Ambush: Misuse or Caveat Emptor? (February 1, 2011). IDEA: The Intellectual Property Law Review, Volume 51 –– Number 1, available at: http://law.unh.edu/assets/images/uploads/publications/idea-vol51-no1-abramson.pdf.
• Rudi Bekkers, René Bongard and Alessandro Nuvolari, An Empirical Study on the Determinants of Essential Patent Claims in Compatibility Standards (July 30, 2011). Research Policy, Vol. 40. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1898873
• Roger G. Brooks and Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment (January-June 2011). International Journal of IT Standards and Standardization Research, 9(1), 1-23, available at: http://www.cravath.com/files/uploads/documents/publications/3285864_1.pdf.
• Esteban Burrone, Standards, Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Standards-setting Process, World Intellectual Property Organization: http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/ip_standards_fulltext.html (last visited: February 28, 2014)
• Dennis W. Carlton and Allan Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of FRAND (April 24, 2013). Journal of Competition Law and Economics. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256007 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2256007
• Mark Chandler, Innovatio Case: Victory for Cisco Customers Makes the Case for Patent Reform, Cisco Blogs: http://blogs.cisco.com/news/innovatio-case-victory-for-cisco-customers-makes-the-case-for-patent-reform/ (last visited: April 8, 2014)
• Thomas H. Chia, Fighting the Smartphone Patent War with RAND-Encumbered Patents (July 21, 2012). Berkeley technology law journal, Volume 27, Annual Review, available at: http://btlj.org/data/articles/27_AR/209-240_Chia_Final_071012_WEB.pdf.
• Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis (2006). Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11156, available at: http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr/216/1/setting_organizations.pdf.
• Jorge L. Contreras and David L. Newman, Developing a Framework for Arbitrating Standards-Essential Patent Disputes (May 2, 2014). Journal of Dispute Resolution, Forthcoming; American University, WCL Research Paper Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2335732.
• Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND (February 3, 2014). Antitrust Law Journal, Forthcoming; American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2014-18. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2374983.
• Jorge L. Contreras, Samsung Proposes a Patent Pledge to Settle EC FRAND Investigation, Patently-o: http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/10/samsung-proposes-a-patent-pledge-to-settle-ec-frand-investigation.html (last visited: May 27, 2014)
• Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent Licensing (March 13, 2013). 79 Antitrust Law Journal 47 (2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2232515 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2232515.
• Thomas F. Cotter, The Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and FRAND Royalties (August 29, 2013), Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-40, available at: http://leconcurrentialiste.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/the-comparative-law-and-economics-of-standard-essential-patents-and-frand-royalties.pdf.
• Daniel Eran Dilger, AuthenTec “Smart Sensor” appears key to Apple's urgent acquisition, appleinsider: http://appleinsider.com/articles/12/08/16/authentec_smart_sensor_appears_key_to_apples_urgent_acquisition (last visited: June 28, 2014)
• Jack Ellis, Google dips into Hon Hai’s top-grade patent portfolio once again, IAM Blog: http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=50da3354-02d1-48e1-b69f-a3a0b39e3816&;q=Foxconn#search=%22Foxconn%22 (last visited: June 28, 2014)
• Jack Ellis, Hon Hai’s IP awareness has put it in a strong position as it looks to the future, IAM Blog: http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=21a6d693-fac3-4329-b685-b177fa3dfb9a&;q=Foxconn#search=%22Foxconn%22 (last visited: June 28, 2014)
• Damien Geradin, The Meaning Of “Fair And Reasonable” In The Context Of Third-Party Determination Of FRAND Terms (2014). George Mason Law Review, volume 21, number 4, available at: http://www.georgemasonlawreview.org/doc/Geradin-Website-Version.pdf.
• Renata Hesse, Six “Small” Proposals for SSOs Before Lunch (October 10, 2012), Department Of Justice, available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/287855.pdf
• Doris Johnson Hines and J. Preston (J.P.) Long, Un-FRAND-ly Behavior (January 17, 2014), BNA’s Patent, Trademark &; Copyright Journal, Finnegan: http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=fd56db63-bdc7-4856-a21d-30ac81a6fc04 (last visited: April 23, 2014)
• Robert D. Keeler, Why Can’t We Be (F)RANDs?: The Effect of Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Commitments on Standard-Essential Patent Licensing (2013). Cardozo Arts &; Entertainment Law Journal, Volume 32, Issue 1, available at: http://www.cardozoaelj.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Keeler-Galleyed-good.pdf.
• Kai-Uwe Kühn, Fiona Scott Morton, Howard Shelanski, Standard Setting Organizations Can Help Solve the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem (March 05, 2013), CPI Antitrust Chronicle, available at: https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Free/ScottMortonetalMar-13Special.pdf.
• Matt Larson, N.D. Cal. excludes expert damages testimony that based royalty rate on patents’ hold-up value (April 23, 2014), Essential Patent Blog: http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2014/04/n-d-cal-exculdes-expert-testimony-basing-damages-on-patent-hold-up/ (last visited: May 22, 2014)
• Matthew P. Larson, Qualcomm and Nokia submit amici curiae briefs to the Federal Circuit in Ericsson v. D-Link appeal (March 13 2014), Association of Corporate Counsel: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=839dff19-26a6-400c-b1d1-082f38557e4b (last visited: May 22, 2014)
• Anne Layne-Farrara and Gerard Llobet, Moving Beyond Simple Examples: Assessing the Incremental Value Rule within Standards (June 2012). International Journal of Industrial Organization, available at: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=JEI2012&;paper_id=99.
• Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents (November 5, 2013). Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2243026. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243026 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2243026.
• Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations (December, 2002). California Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 6, available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1392&;context=californialawreview.
• Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, Standard-Essential Patents (November 5, 2013), Harvard Business School Working Paper 14-038. Available at: http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-038_c030ca39-5339-4447-b952-8132110260bf.pdf.
• Francois Leveque and Yann Ménière, Vagueness in RAND Licensing Obligations is Unreasonable for Patent Owners (June 2010). CERNA Working paper, available at: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/48/82/08/PDF/CWPS_2009-04.pdf.
• Douglas Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment (2012). Journal of Scholarly Perspectives, 8(01), available at: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1jx6g49t.
• David W. Long, Judge Stark bifurcates Blu-ray SEP case to determine essentiality and FRAND rate before liability issues, Association of Corporate Counsel: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=28207037-0fe3-4f7a-be43-37e46b3ed735 (last visited: April 24, 2014)
• Lorraine Luk, Foxconn Is Quietly Working With Google on Robotics, Wall Street Journal: http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/02/11/foxconn-working-with-google-on-robotics/ (last visited: June 28, 2014)
• J. Derek Mason and Anne Louise St. Martin, Arbitration: A Quick And Effective Means For Patent Dispute Resolution (Spring 2011). North Carolina Journal Of Law &; Technology, Volume 12, Issue 2, available at: http://www.ncjolt.org/sites/default/files/St_Martin_Mason_301_324.pdf.
• Florian Mueller, Apple, Google dismiss patent suits against each other, settle from position of mutual weakness, Foss Patents: http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/05/apple-google-dismiss-patent-suits.html (last visited: May 21, 2014)
• Florian Mueller, IEEE to court: don't rely on standards bodies to 'take a direct role in enforcing patent commitments', Foss Patent: http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/12/ieee-to-court-dont-rely-on-standards.html (last visited: April 5, 2014)
• Florian Mueller, Samsung's appeal of ITC ruling on its complaint against Apple only about standard-essential patent, FOSS Patents: http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/11/samsungs-appeal-of-itc-ruling-on-its.html (last visited: May 28, 2014)
• Ruud Peters, The future of IP is ours to win (March/April 2014). Available at Intellectual Asset Management: http://www.iam-magazine.com/.
• Jonathan Radcliffe and Gillian Sproul, FRAND and the smartphone wars (December 2011/January 2012). Intellectual Property magazine, available at: http://www.mayerbrown.com/Files/Publication/477a076f-dd7e-408c-8321-64edf33c190e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5b202a76-bc80-4467-b286-7a3b8e90e06d/Frand_Smartphone_Sproul.pdf.
• James Ratliff and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Use and Threat of Injunctions in the RAND Context (January 2013), Journal of Competition Law and Economics, pp. 1-22, available at: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Ratiff-Rubinfeld_Jan2013.pdf.
• Kent Richardson and Erik Oliver, The Brokered Patent Market in 2013 (January/February 2014). Available at Intellectual Asset Management: http://www.iam-magazine.com/.
• Helena Selander, The assessment of patent pools under antitrust law: A comparative analysis (September 2013). Lund University, Department of Law, available at: http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&;recordOId=4230801&;fileOId=4275665.
• Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Setting (January 2001). The National Bureau of Economic Research, Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pp. 119-150, available at: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.pdf.
• J. Gregory Sidak, The Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties (January 12, 2014). Oxford Journals, Jnl of Competition Law &; Economics, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pp. 931-1055. Available at: http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/4/931.abstract.
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• U.S. Dep’t of Justice &; U.S. Patent &; Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards- Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments (January 8, 2013), available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf.
• Romesh Vaitilingam, Standard-essential patents: The question of FRAND licensing and its impact on standard-setting, competition and innovation (December 2013). Toulouse Network for Information Technology, Newsletter, Issue 11. Available at: http://www.idei.fr/tnit/newsletter_1312.pdf.
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三、司法判決暨其他政府決定

• Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., Nos. 2012–1548, 2012–1549. --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL 1646435, C.A.Fed. (Ill.) (April 25, 2014)
• Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00178. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2012 WL 7989412, W.D.Wis. (November 08, 2012)
• Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00178. 886 F.Supp.2d 1061, W.D.Wis. (August 10, 2012)
• Apple Inc. v. Motorola Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540. 869 F.Supp.2d 901, N.D.Ill. (June 22, 2012)
• eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., No. 05–130. 547 U.S. 388, 126 S.Ct. 1837, U.S. (May 15, 2006)
• Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc., No. 6:10-cv-473. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 4046225, E.D.Tex. (August 06, 2013)
• Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., Civ. A. No. 99-195. 318 F. Supp. 1116, S.D.N.Y. (May 28, 1970)
• Golden Bridge Technology v. Apple Inc., Case No. 5:12–cv–04882–PSG. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 2194501, N.D.Cal. (May 18, 2014)
• GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc., Case No. 12-CV-02885-LHK. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 1494247, N.D.Cal. (April 16, 2014)
• In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, No. 1:11-cv-09308. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 5593609, N.D.Ill. (October 03, 2013)
• In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, No. 1:11-cv-09308. 956 F.Supp.2d 925, N.D.Ill. (July 26, 2013)
• InterDigital Communications, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., NO. 1:13-CV-00010-RGA, 1:13-CV-00009-RGA. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 2206218, D.Del. (May 28, 2014)
• In the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION Washington, D.C., Inv. No. 337-TA-794. (June 4, 2013)
• In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC, a limited liability company, and Google Inc., a corporation, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Docket No. C-4410. (July 23, 2013)
• Lucent Technologies v. Gateway Inc., Nos. 2008–1485, 2008–1487, 2008–1495. 580 F.3d 1301, C.A.Fed. (Cal.) (September 11, 2009)
• Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR. Slip Copy, 2013 WL 6000017, W.D.Wash. (November 12, 2013)
• Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR. Slip Copy, 2013 WL 5373179, W.D.Wash. (September 24, 2013)
• Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 2111217, W.D.Wash. (April 25, 2013)
• Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 2014–1089. --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2014 WL 1760369, C.A.Fed. (Wash.) (May 05, 2014)
• Realtek Semiconductor Corporation v. LSI Corporation, No. C-12-03451-RMW. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2014 WL 2738216, N.D.Cal. (June 16, 2014)
• Realtek Semiconductor Corporation v. LSI Corporation, No. C-12-03451-RMW. Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 4778140, N.D.Cal. (September 06, 2013)
• RE: Disapproval of the US. International Trade Commission’s Determination In the Matter of Certain Electronic Devices, Including Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, and Tablet Computers, Investigation No. 337-TA-794, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTIVE. (August 3, 2013)
• Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. International Trade Com'n, No. 2013–1519. --- Fed.Appx. ----, 2014 WL 1910429, C.A.Fed. (May 14, 2014)
• WhitServe LLC v. Computer Packages Inc., Case Nos. 2011-1206, 1261, Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2012.
• Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., Nos. 2011–1206, 2011–1261. 694 F.3d 10, C.A.Fed. (Conn.) (August 07, 2012)

參、網路資料

一、中文部分

科技產業資訊室，專利情報：
http://cdnet.stpi.narl.org.tw/techroom/pclass/main_pclass.htm
AVS工作組：http://www.avs.org.cn/

二、外文部分

3GPP: http://www.3gpp.org/
DOJ: http://www.justice.gov/
EISI: http://www.etsi.org/
FTC: http://www.ftc.gov/
IEEE: http://standards.ieee.org/
ISO: http://www.iso.org/iso/home.htm
ITU: http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Pages/default.aspx
JAMS, ADR Glossary: http://www.jamsadr.com/adr-glossary/
PATENT FREEDOM: https://www.patentfreedom.com/
USITC: http://www.usitc.gov/
USPTO: http://www.uspto.gov/
VITA: http://www.vita.com/
WIPO: http://www.wipo.int/portal/en/index.html