臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文探討產品同質但生產技術及成本有差異的雙占廠商，面臨業外研發廠商之成本節約技術移轉授權，業內低成本廠商如何因應的議題。以多個階段賽局模型的完善子賽局均衡分析，本文證明業內低成本廠商可以搶在業外廠商技術授權之前先做技術移轉，以獲取利益。
均衡結局與授權契約息息相關，本文依照業內、外授權廠商收取固定權利金或者單位權利金，分成四種授權的組合來做分析。
當業內、外廠商技術授權都收取固定授權金，只有在業內廠商間的生產成本差距夠小，低成本廠商才願意授權其技術；當業內做技術授權，業外廠商一定會同時授權移轉其技術給所有業內廠商。業外技術節約成本的程度會影響業內授權，節省成本愈多，授權條件愈嚴苛。
當業內廠商收取固定權利金，業外廠商收取單位權利金，業外廠商授權後業內廠商之間的成本差距並沒有改變，故業內低成本廠商在成本差距大時，不授權給高成本廠商。
業內廠商選擇單位權利金，業外廠商選擇固定權利金，如果成本相距甚大，業內低成本廠商為了促使業外廠商降低固定授權金，會策略性地降低單位權利金，使之低於被授權者節省的成本，成本差距中或小，低成本廠商沒有降低單位權利金，但授權好處抵掉了競爭的損失，低成本廠商會授權給高成本廠商。
當業內、外廠商皆收取單位授權金，業內低成本廠商依據廠商間的成本差異大小來決定是否授權，在成本差異大，業內低成本廠商願意降低單位權利金授權給業內高成本廠商，但與未授權的利潤相比，可以發現，並非在所有條件下授權的利潤皆比未授權的利潤好，在成本差異小，業內低成本廠商選擇技術移轉給高成本廠商。

目錄
摘要................................................................................................................................ I
目錄...............................................................................................................................II
圖目錄......................................................................................................................... III
第一章緒論 .................................................................................................................1
1.1 研究動機與目的...........................................................................................1
1.2 研究架構........................................................................................................3
1.3 文獻回顧........................................................................................................4
第二章模型設定.........................................................................................................7
第三章授權策略....................................................................................................... 11
3.1 業內外授權金皆為固定權利金................................................................. 11
3.2 業內廠商選擇固定權利金，業外廠商選擇單位權利金.........................22
3.3 業內廠商選擇單定權利金，業外廠商選擇固定權利金.........................28
3.4 業內外授權金皆為單位權利金.................................................................43
第四章結論 ...............................................................................................................53
參考文獻......................................................................................................................55

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