近來遠航爆發弊案後，公司操縱盈餘以虛飾財務報表之問題日益受到重視，過去探討公司治理與盈餘管理的文獻相當廣泛，然而甚少文獻探討不同負債比率下，董事會特性與盈餘管理之關係。因此本文以探討我國上市公司之董事會特性在不同負債比率對盈餘管理之影響，是越具有監督效果？或者造成反效果，使得管理者更易從事盈餘管理？本研究對象為1997年至2007年兼具時間序列及橫斷面之平衡式縱橫資料（balanced panel data）共277家台灣上市公司，並且採用Gonzalez， Terasvirta and Dijk (2004，2005)所發展的縱橫門檻平滑移轉迴歸模型（Panel Smooth Transition Regression Model，PSTR）。
本研究之實證結果顯示，負債比率存有兩個門檻，其比率分別為29.6%及33.4%，本文依據門檻值將樣本分成低負債(小於等於29.56%)、中負債(介於29.56%與33.4%)與高負債(大於33.4%)公司。(一)在低負債公司，管理者持股比率、董事會規模及外部董事席次比率與盈餘管理無關。（二）在中負債公司，管理者持股比率與盈餘管理呈負相關，管理者沒有違約風險及高利息成本壓力，且管理者擁有足夠股權時，符合利益一致假說(convergence of interest hypothesis) ，將會以公司利益最大化為前提，管理者較不會從事盈餘管理；在高負債公司，管理者持股比率與盈餘管理呈正相關，管理者為擔心違反負債契約，較有動機從事盈餘管理，以達到債權人所要求之盈餘。（三）無論中負債公司或高負債公司，董事會規模與盈餘管理皆呈負相關，表示董事會規模越大，越不會從事盈餘管理，尤其在中負債公司，更能有效地發揮監督機制，抑制管理者從事盈餘管理。（四）無論是低、中或高負債公司之外部董事席次比率與盈餘管理無關。

Recently after the burst of Far Eastern Airline fraud case, the problem that companies manipulating earnings to prettify financial statements has drawn increasing concerns as days go by. In the past literatures that explore corporate governance and earnings management are rather extensive, but few has explored the correlation between the characteristics of the board of directors and earnings management under different debt ratio, which is the purpose of this study.
Results of this study show that: (1)In low liabilities companies (with debt ratio of less than or equal to 29.56%), management ownership interest, size of the board of directors and numbers of outside directors are not correlated to earnings management. (2)In medium liabilities companies (with debt ratio between 29.56% and 33.4%), managers do not have default risk or pressure of high interest cost and when managers has enough ownership interest, as in consistency with the convergence of interest hypothesis, they are less likely to engage in earnings management. In high liabilities companies (with debt ratio of greater than33.4%), managers tend to worry about breach of debt contract and therefore are more motivated to engage in earnings management in order to achieve the earnings required by creditors. (3) Regardless of being a medium or high liabilities company, as the size of the board gets larger, companies are less likely to engage in earnings management. Especially in medium liabilities companies, a large size board of directors can exert supervising mechanism more effectively, inhibiting managers to engage in earnings management. (4) Regardless of being a low, medium or high liabilities company, the numbers of outside directors are not correlated to earnings management.

摘要I
ABSTRACT III
誌謝V
圖目錄IX
表目錄X
第一章 緒論1
第一節 研究背景與動機1
第二節 研究目的6
第三節 研究架構與流程8
第二章 文獻探討11
第三章 研究方法32
第一節 研究樣本與樣本來源32
第二節 變數定義與衡量34
第三節 縱衡平滑移轉迴歸模型 41
第四節 縱橫平滑移轉迴歸模型之設定48
第四章 實證結果52
第一節 基本敘述性統計52
第二節 縱橫門檻平滑移轉迴歸模型之實證分析59
第五章 結論與建議68
第一節 結論68
第二節 研究建議70
第三節 研究限制71
參考文獻72

圖1-1研究流程圖9
圖1-2假說流程圖10
圖3-1 M=1之轉換模型44
圖3-2 M =2之轉換模型45

表2公司治理文獻整理25
表3-1樣本篩選說明33
表3-2本研究樣本之產業分類33
表3-3 變數之衡量40
表4-1總樣本各變數之敘述性統計值54
表4-2各年度之樣本敘述性統計 55
表4-3-1以負債比率為門檻變數，董事會特性對裁決性應計項目之同質性檢60
表4-3-2以負債比率為門檻變數，董事會特性對裁決性應計項目之轉換區間個數檢定61
表4-3-3以負債比率為門檻變數，董事會特性與裁決性應計項目之門檻檢定及門檻係數61
表4-3-4以負債比率作為門檻變數，董事會特性與控制變數對裁決性應計項目之係數估計 66
表4-3-5低負債、中負債和高負債各年度樣本特性分配表67

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