臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究假定被併購公司為獲取併購市場青睞及較高併購利益，有從事盈餘管理之誘因，意圖蒙蔽主併公司，以獲得較高之併購價格或意願。
本研究調查2000年至2008年間之美國上市公司。針對已完成併購之樣本，發現被併購公司在併購宣告前四個年度的異常應計數呈每年上下規律跳動之趨勢，而在併購宣告前一個年度的異常應計數則出現陡升現象。故本研究嘗試以獨立樣本t檢定、成對樣本t檢定及合併橫斷面迴歸分析檢測被併購公司在併購宣告前一個年度的異常應計數是否偏高。
實證結果顯示：(1)被併購公司在併購宣告前一年度處於獲利狀態下，其異常應計數顯著為正且顯著高於過去年度；(2)被併購公司在併購宣告前一年度處於獲利狀態下，低成長機會公司的異常應計數顯著大於高成長機會公司。本研究證實被併購公司在獲利狀態下，的確會進一步虛增盈餘，誇大高獲利，此現象與主併公司的併購決策行為息息相關。

I hypothesize that in order to carry off much favor in M&A markets, the acquired firms have incentives to engage in earnings management and intend to cheat the acquiring firms into mergers or acquisitions with higher prices.
I survey the public listed companies in USA between 2000 and 2008. In a sample of mergers & acquisitions completed, the trend line of yearly abnormal accruals of the acquired firms before the announcement of M&A fluctuates up and down, and sharply increases immediately preceding the announcement of M&A. So, independent samples t test, paired samples t test, and pooled cross-sectional regression are adopted to examine if the yearly abnormal accruals of the acquired firms immediately preceding the announcement of M&A are higher.
Empirical results reveal that considering the acquired firms of profit immediately preceding the announcement of M&A, (1) the yearly abnormal accruals are significantly positive and higher than before; moreover, (2) the yearly abnormal accruals of the firms of low growth opportunity are larger than that of high growth opportunity.
This study provides the evidences that when the acquired firms get profit immediately preceding the announcement of M&A, they may further manipulate earnings upwards and boast high profitability, closely linked to the M&A decision behaviors of the acquiring firms.

摘要 I
Abstract II
誌謝 III
目錄 VI
表目錄 VII
圖目錄 VIII
壹、緒論 1
一、研究背景與動機 1
二、研究目的 3
三、研究發現 4
四、研究架構 5
貳、文獻回顧 6
一、企業併購之相關理論 6
二、盈餘管理之相關理論 13
三、併購與盈餘管理間之相關文獻探討 15
參、研究設計 18
一、研究假說 18
二、樣本選擇 19
三、變數衡量與實證模型 21
肆、實證結果 27
一、敘述性統計分析 27
二、目標公司盈餘管理行為探討 28
三、區分成長性高低探討目標公司盈餘管理行為 32
四、實證模型檢定 34
伍、敏感性測試 38
陸、研究結論與建議 42
一、研究結論 42
二、研究建議 43
參考文獻 45

表一 裁量性應計數衡量之敘述性統計 .27
表二 目標公司併購宣告前一年DA之平均數 30
表三 目標公司併購宣告前一年及前二年DA成對樣本t檢定 31
表四 目標公司區分成長性下併購宣告前一年DA之平均數 32
表五 獲利之目標公司區分成長性下併購宣告前一年DA平均數 33
表六 高低成長機會之目標公司併購宣告前一年DA獨立樣本平均數差
異之t檢定 34
表七 實證變數之敘述性統計 35
表八 實證變數之相關係數矩陣 35
表九 實證模型結果表 36
表十 目標公司併購宣告前一年及前三年DA成對樣本t檢定 38
表十一 敏感性測試之實證模型結果表 39

圖一 目標公司併購宣告前四年DA變動趨勢圖 28
圖二 獲利狀態下之目標公司併購宣告前四年DA變動趨勢圖 29

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