本研究以2002年至2008年我國上市、櫃公司為研究對象，探討產業競爭力、訴訟風險與獨立董(監)事對審計公費影響之研究。實證結果發現，(1)當企業所處之產業競爭程度會對企業績效有顯著負向之影響，代表高度的產業競爭程度確實會降低企業績效，且公司所處之產業競爭程度會重大影響審計公費，當產業競爭程度越高，達到投資者的預期越形困難，因此會增加審計公費；(2)獨立董事席次比與獨立監察人席次比均會正向影響公司之獲利能力，此代表當公司的獨立董（監）事席次比例較高時，獨立董(監)事能發揮其監督機制，致使代理成本降低，因此使審計公費降低；(3)當公司之獲利能力低於同產業及債務比率高於同業時，會增加會計師之訴訟風險，致使審計公費增加；(4)2008年的金融風暴與審計公費有顯著正向之關係，代表會計師會考量整體經濟環境對其審計風險之影響，進而調高審計公費；(5)電子產業會有顯著較高的審計公費，此可能係因電子產業一般會有較複雜的經營特性，可能導致較高的審計風險所致。
　　綜上所述，本研究結果指出當企業面對之產業競爭度高、獲利能力較同業差且負債比率較同業高及大環境之經濟變差，可能會使企業面臨較高的資金壓力或艱困的經營環境，相對產生較高的經營風險，因此，會計師會投入較多的成本來降低審計風險，導致有較高的審計公費，但獨立董(監)事確實能發揮公司治理職能，提高公司之獲利能力，進而降低審計公費。

　　This study investigates the relation among industry competitiveness, litigation risk and independent directors/supervisors on the audit fee. It focuses on TSEC-listed and GTSM-traded companies for seven years from 2002 to 2008.
　　The empirical results show five key findings. First, industry competitiveness has a negative and significant impact on business performance and positive on the audit fee . This implies that the audit fee for firms in highly competitive industries will be higher than firms in lowly competitive industries. Second, independent directors/supervisors have significant positive relationships with EPS and ROA, then reduce the audit fee.
　　Third, this result refers to CPA will have higher litigation risk when the firms with lowly EPS and ROA or highly debt ratio. It implies CPA will adopt more efficient audit procedures to reduce his / her litigation risk. Adopting more efficient audit procedures will increase the audit cost, then increase the audit fee.
　　Forth, the result shows that there is significant positive relationship between the financial storm in Taiwan and the audit fee. It means that CPA will assess the impact of economic climate on the audit risk. Finally, the firms in the information technology industry will have significant higher audit fee. The reason is the firms in the information technology industry have more complexity of operating the organization than others, then lead to increase audit risk and the audit fee.
　　In summary, if a firm is in highly competitive industry, or it has low ROA and high debt ratio, it maybe has higher audit fee. The independent director/supervisors system is an assistant mechanism in the corporate governance. It will have significant impact on the audit fee.

目錄
中文摘要 I
ABSTRACT III
謝誌 IV
目錄 V
表目錄 VII
圖目錄 VIII
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與背景 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究貢獻 6
第四節 研究架構 7
第貳章 文獻探討與假說建立 9
第一節 產業競爭力 11
第二節 訴訟風險 13
第三節 獨立董(監)事 17
第參章 研究方法 20
第一節 變數定義與實證模型 20
第二節 研究方法 28
第三節 資料來源與樣本敘述 30
第肆章 實證結果與分析 32
第一節 敘述性統計量及相關係數 32
第二節 多變量迴歸模型與3SLS實證結果分析 35
第三節 穩健性測試 39
第伍章 結論與建議 43
第一節 結論 43
第二節 研究限制與建議 46
參考文獻 47

表目錄
表1 本研究之假說與目的彙整 19
表2 變數定義彙整表 27
表3 樣本篩選情形及分類 31
表4 變數基本統計量 33
表5 相關係數矩陣圖 34
表6 產業競爭力、訴訟風險與獨立董(監)事對審計公費影響之迴歸結果 36
表7 產業競爭力、訴訟風險與獨立董(監)事對審計公費影響 之3SLS迴歸結果 37
表8 產業競爭力、訴訟風險與獨立董(監)事對審計公費影響之迴歸結果 -控制上市櫃別 40
表9 產業競爭力、訴訟風險與獨立董(監)事對審計公費影響 之3SLS迴歸結果-控制上市櫃別 42

圖目錄
圖 1研究流程 8

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