臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近年來企業舞弊事件層出不窮，管理階層因為自身的利益，透過操弄財務報表，造成許多企業舞弊事件。本研究探討政府機構為免費的外部審計人員角色時，避免企業透過揭露不實的財務報表資訊，達到避稅的目的。政府機構是否有誘因使其政府的相關人員對企業進行監督的責任，防止企業進行各種手段的逃稅。本研究認為當防弊成本過高時，政府就沒有誘因去監督公司。因此，政府會降低防弊成本，消除資訊不對稱，有利於防止企業逃漏稅，讓業主揭露財務報表的真實資訊。
本研究亦獲得以下結論：1.主理人風險喜好偏好不同，會得到不同的結果。2.代理人的策略決定於代理人獲得的薪資報酬。3.當代理人努力的成本等於努力的水準時，代理人選擇付出低努力，主理人不需逃漏稅，則政府亦不防弊。4.代理人的薪資報酬為努力水準與努力的成本的平均值時，代理人選擇付出高努力，主理人則會使用逃漏稅的方式來達到高利潤，此時政府應盡監督作用進行防弊維護租稅公平。

During recent years, the corporate fraud incidents seem to be endless and the management level would manipulate financial report for the sake of its own interest, entailing with plenty of enterprise frauds as well. This research intends to explore that the government institution acts in the role of external auditor that is free of charge and prevents the enterprises from disclosing false financial information to achieve tax evasion. In addition, whether government institution has the incentive to prod the government related personnel to proceed to their oversight over the enterprise so as to prevent enterprise from engaging to various tax evasions would also be explored.
This research realizes the fact when the cost for fraud prevention is too high government has no incentive to exercise their oversight. Hence government would lower their fraud prevention costs by ridding off the information asymmetries which can be conducive to the prevention from enterprise tax evasion in addition to rendering the proprietor to disclosing truthful financial reports.
This research acquires the following findings: 1. Different risk preferences for the principal would lead to different outcomes. 2. Strategies committed by the agent would determine the salary compensation for the agent. 3. When the cost of efforts from the agent equates to the level of efforts, then the agent would choose the minimum efforts available and the principal is not compelled to tax evasion and there is no need for the government to deter the tax evasion as well. 4. When the agent’s salary compensation is the average value of the level and the cost of efforts, then the agent would choose the high level of efforts and the principal would adopt the tax evasion approach so as to acquire high profitability; at the moment, the government should proceed to effective tax evasion supervision so as to prevent from any wrongdoings to achieve the tax equity.

摘要 I
Abstract II
誌謝 IV
目錄 V
圖目錄 VII
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構與流程 4
第貳章 文獻探討 6
第一節 代理問題之相關文獻 6
第二節 不同風險下的確定等值 9
第三節 監督機制 12
第參章 模型架構 16
第一節　誘因限制式與參與限制式 17
第二節　賽局進行式 21
第三節　目標函數 22
第四節　賽局階段分析 24
第五節　子賽局分析 26
第六節　命題與分析 27
第肆章 結論與實務意涵 35
第一節 結論 35
第二節 實務意涵 37
參考文獻 39

圖目錄
圖1 研究流程圖 ................... 5
圖2 風險規者 ............... 10
圖3 風險追求者 ............... 10
圖4 風險中立者 ..................... 11
圖5 賽局三階段分析圖 ..................... 20
圖6 代理人努力的決策 ............... 24
圖7 主理人 逃稅及政府防弊的子賽局 .... 24
圖8 主理人 逃稅及政府防弊的子賽局 ...... 25

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