臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

隨著社會經濟發展以及時代的變遷，女性在職場上的表現已不亞於男性。近年來，女性董事的崛起引起許多社會的關注，女性的性格特質往往使她們在做重要決策以及風險偏好上異於男性。在公司的重要決策中，現金增資扮演著為公司籌集資金的重要管道，但是其本身存在有資訊不對稱的問題，所以存在增資折價的情況。由於相關文獻指出，董事女性的存在會提高公司資訊揭露的質量，有助於減緩資訊不對稱的情況，是以本研究擬深入探討公司聘任女性董事對公司現金增資折價之影響，以補相關文獻之不足。
本研究自台灣經濟新報中選取1997年到2017年期間共706家公司，合計1,132筆現金增資樣本，計算其現金增資折價之幅度，進而檢視此折價幅度與公司聘任女性董事之關聯性。實證結果顯示整體而言，女性董事的存在對公司現金增資的折價無顯著影響；本研究進一步按公司規模大小分成兩群子樣本分析，發現在小規模的公司中，女性董事的存在有助於降低現金增資的折價幅度，惟本文亦發現在此類公司中當女性董事本身亦是董事長時，反而對折價有不利影響。在現金增資短期市場反應的部分，結果則顯示當公司規模較小時，女性董事本身亦是董事長對負宣告報酬有達到減緩效果；在長期績效的檢定當中，結果也顯示當公司規模較小時，公司聘任女性董事對公司長期績效而言最能發揮功效，有助於公司績效的成長。

With the development of the social economy and the changes of the times, women’s performance in the workplace is no less than that of men. In recent years, the rise of female directors has attracted the attention of many societies. Womens personality traits often make them different from men in making important decisions and risk preferences. In the companys important decision-making, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) play an important channel for raising funds for the company, but it has the problem of information asymmetry, so there exists underpricing around SEOs. As the literature points out, the existence of female directors will improve the quality of information disclosure and help to alleviate the information asymmetry. Our study aims to explore the impact of the appointment of female directors on SEOs underpricing.
Based on a sample of 1132 SEOs from the database of the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) over 1997 to 2017, we calculate the underpricing and then examined the relationship between the underpricing and the appointment of female directors. The overall results show that the existence of female directors has no significant effect on the underpricing of SEOs. The sample is further divided into two sub-samples according to the company size. The subsample analyses indicate that the presence of female directors helps to alleviate the underpricing for firms in small scale. However, we also find that when the female director is also the chairman of the board, it has an adverse effect on the underpricing. In the part of the short-term market reaction of SEOs, the results show that when the company size is small, the female director is also the chairman of the board, it has a mitigation effect on short-term market reaction of SEOs. In the long-term performance verification, the results also show that when the company size is small, the companys appointment of female directors can best serve the companys long-term performance and contribute to the growth of company performance.

中文摘要 ………………………………………………………………. i
英文摘要 ………………………………………………………………. ii
誌謝 ………………………………………………………………. iv
目錄 ………………………………………………………………. v
表目錄 ………………………………………………………………. vi
圖目錄 ………………………………………………………………. vii
第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………. 1
1.1 研究背景與動機……………………………………………. 1
1.2 研究目的……………………………………………………. 1
1.3 研究流程……………………………………………………. 2
第二章 文獻探討……………………………………………………. 3
2.1 女性董事相關文獻…………………………………………. 3
2.2 現金增資相關文獻…………………………………………. 3
第三章 研究方法……………………………………………………. 5
3.1 資料與樣本來源……………………………………………. 5
3.2 變數衡量……………………………………………………. 5
3.2.1 依變數－現金增資折價之衡量……………………………. 5
3.2.2 主要解釋變數─女性董事之衡量…………………………. 5
3.2.3 控制變數……………………………………………………. 6
3.2.4 現金增資短期市場反應……………………………………. 8
第四章 實證分析與結果……………………………………………. 10
4.1 敘述性統計…………………………………………………. 10
4.1.1 樣本特性……………………………………………………. 10
4.1.2 敘述性統計量………………………………………………. 11
4.2 迴歸分析……………………………………………………. 12
4.3 現金增資短期市場反應…………………………….……… 17
4.4 延伸測試…………………………….……………………… 22
4.4.1 內生性檢定─遺漏變數……………………………………. 22
4.4.2 女性董事參與各項委員會之情形…………………………. 27
4.4.3 強韌性檢定─現金增資長期績效的影響…………………. 29
第五章 結論…………………………………………………………. 34
參考文獻 ………………………………………………………………. 35
英文論文大綱 ………………………………………………………………. 38

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