臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

公司的現金持有已經變成維持公司營運很重要的工具之ㄧ，但公司的現金保留也易被管理階層作為私有利益之用。而機構投資人參與公司治理不僅能加強公司治理的效能也能減輕公司現金持有所造成的代理問題。本篇研究目的為調查機構投資人對公司現金持有的影響以及投資機會對機構投資公司其現金持有之影響。實證結果顯示，公司的機構所有權會增加公司的現金持有，而公司的投資機會也與公司的現金保留呈現正向關係。此外，本研究也進一步探討機構所有權對現金持有之價值所造成的影響，實證結果指出當公司的機構所有權增加時，投資人給予公司現金持有的評價也會比較高，表示出機構投資人參與公司治理能執行其監督功能對公司的現金資源給予較大的保護。

Cash holdings in firms have become one of important tools in maintaining the operating of corporate, but are possibly abused by entrenched managers. Institutional investors improve the corporate governance and also mitigate the agency problems of cash holdings in firms. The purpose of the study is to investigate the impacts of institutional investors on firms’ cash holdings and further the effect of investment opportunities on the relationship between institutional investors and cash holdings. The results show that the ownership of institutions increases firms’ cash holdings and further find that the relationship is enhanced in firms with more investment opportunities. In addition, this study examines whether the value of cash holdings is higher in the firms with more institutional investors and the empirical evidences indicate that the value of cash holdings is significantly increased through institutional ownership. Therefore, it shows that institutional investors can play the role of monitoring in firms to provide more protection of firms’ cash resources for investors.

Contents
摘要………………………………………………………………………………......III
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………IV
Contents…………………………………………………………………………….....V
Table Contents……………………………………………………………………….VI

1. Introduction 1
2. Theories and Development of Hypotheses 3
2.1. Theories of Corporate Cash Holdings 3
2.2. Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance 5
2.3. Institutional Investors and Cash Holdings 9
2.4. Institutional Investors, Cash Holdings and Investment Opportunities. 11
2.5. Institutional Investors and Value of Cash 12
3. Research Design 14
3.1 Cash Level Regression Model 14
3.2 Investment Opportunities 15
3.3 Cash Value Regression Model 16
4. Sample and Empirical Results 17
4.1 Data and Sample 17
4.2 Summary Statistics 18
4.3 Regression Analysis 21
5. Conclusions and Suggestions 29
References 31

References
Admati, A. R., P. Pleiderer, and J. Zechner. (1994). Large shareholder activism, risk
sharing, and financial market equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy ,102, 1097-1130.
Agrawal, A and G. N. Mandelker. (1990). Large shareholders and the monitoring
of managers:The case of anti-takeover charter amendments, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,25, 143-161.
Agrawal,Anup, and T.Nasser.(2010). Blockholders on boards and CEO compensation, turnover and firm valuation, Working Paper, University of Alabama.
Bertrand,Marianne,andSehdil,M.(2001). Are CEOs paid for luck? The ones without principals are, The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,116, 901-932.
Black, Bernard S.(1990). Shareholder passivity reexamined, Michigan Law Review 89, 520-608.
Black, B. (1990).Shareholders Passivity Reexamine, Michigan Law Review,
520-608 (December).
Brickley, J., R. Lease, and C. Smith. (1988). Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendment. Journal of Financial Economics, 267-291(Jan/Mar).
Chen, Yin Chi. (2003).The Relationship between Shareholders'' Right Exercise of Collective Investment Schemes and Corporate Government,Securities and Futures Institute.
Chen, Yenn Ru. (2008). Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Listed New Economy versus Old Economy Firms. Journal of Finance, 16(5), 430-442.
Chung, R., Firth,M., and Kim, J.B.(2002). Institutional Monitoring and Opportunistic Earnings Management. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1), 29-48.
Chu, Te Fang. (2009). Corporate Governance and CIS Governance: The Case of the Securities Investment Trust Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares in Taiwan. Taipei University Law Review, 69,87-146.
Coffee, J. ( 1991). Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor. Columbia Law review,1277-1368(October).
Cordtz, D. (1993). Corporate Hangmen: Hanging some CEOs may encourage others,
but should pension funds wield the rope? Financial World, 162, 24-28.
Cyert, Richard M., Sok-Hyon Kang and Praveen Kumar.(2002).Corporate governance, takeovers, and top management compensation: Theory and evidence. Management Science, 48, 453-469.
Dittmar, A., Mahrt-Smith, J. and Henri Servaes. (2003). International corporate governance and corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,38, 111-134.
Dittmar, A., and Mahrt-Smith, J. (2007). Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics ,83, 599-634.
Dobrzynski, J. H. (1993). Corporate Board May Finally be Shaping Up, Business Week, 36, 26.
Drobetz,W., Gruninger, M. and Hirschvogl.(2009).Information asymmetry and the value of cash, FMA conference,Turin.
Harford,J. (1999). Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 54, 1969-1997.
Harford, J., Mansi, S. A., Maxwell,W. F. ( 2008). Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US. Journal of Financial Economics, 87, 535-555.
Jensen, Michael C.(1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76, 323-329.
Jonse, M. Garrido. (1990). Optimism and pessimism: Complementary Views on the Institutional Investors’ Role in Corporate Governance, in: Klaus J. Hopt, Hamburg and Eddy Wymeersch Capital Markets and Company Law, Oxford University Press.
Kalcheva, Ivalina and Karl, V. Lins. (2007). International evidence on cash holdings and expected managerial agency problems, forthcoming in Review of Financial Studies.
Kao, Lan Feng. (2002). The effects of shares collateralized by board of directors on accounting earnings and firm performance, Doctoral paper, Department of Accounting National Cheng Kung University.
Kee, H. Chung and Hao Zhang. (2008). Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, forthcoming.
Khan, R., D. Dharwadkar and P. Brandes. (2005). Institutional ownership and CEO compensation: a longitudinal examination. Journal of Business Research, 58, 1078-1088.
Kim, Chang-Soo., David C. Mauer, and Ann Sherman, A. (1998). The determinants of corporate liquidity: theory and evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,33, 305-334.
Lee, Kin Wai and Lee, Cheng Few. (2009). Cash Holdings, Corporate Governance Structure and Firm Valuation. Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, 12(3), 475-508.
Marsh, P. R. (1997). Short-Termism on Trial in Corporate Governance: Economic,
Management, and Financial Issues. Oxford University Press.
Schauten, M.B.J., Van Dijk, D., Van der Waal, J-P. (2011). Corporate governance and the value of excess cash holdings of large European firms. European Financial Management, forthcoming.
Masulis R. W., Wang C., Xie, F. (2009). Agency Problems at Dual-class Companies. Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes. (1995). Equity ownership and the two faces of debt. Journal of Financial Economics,39,131-157.
Mikkelson, W. H., Partch, M. M. (2003). Do persistent large cash reserves hinder performance? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 275-294.
Miller, M.H., Orr, D. (1966). A model of the demand for money by firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 413-435.
Mohanty, P. (1998). On the practical impossibility of market efficiency, ICFAI Journal of Applied Finance, 58-64.
Monks, Robert A. G. (1995). Corporate Governance in the Twenty-First Century. A
Preliminary Outline. Corporate Governance Quarterly , 2,11-28.
Myers, Stewart C. and Nicholas A. Majluf. (1984). Corporate financings and investment decisions when firms have information the investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics ,13, 187-221.
Myers, S. C., Rajan, R. G. (1998). The paradox of liquidity, Quarterly Journal of Economics , 3, 733-771.
Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R. and Williamson. R. (1999). The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics, 52, 3-46.
Ozkan, Aydin and Ozkan, N. (2004). Corporate cash holdings : An empirical investigation of UK companies.Journal of Banking and Finance,28, 2103-2134.
Pinkowitz, L., R. Stulz and R. Williamson . (2004). Why do firms in countries with
poor protection of investor rights hold more cash, NBER working paper ,10188.
Pinkowitz, L., R. Stulz and R. Williamson.(2006). Does the contribution of cash holdings and dividends to firm value depend on governance? A cross-country analysis. Journal of Finance, 61, 2725-2751.
Pinkowitz, L. and R. Williamson.( 2007). What is the market value of a dollar of corporate cash? Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19(3), 74-81.
Pound, J. (1988). Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight.
Journal of Financial and Economics, 20,237-265.
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1986). Large Shareholders and Corporate Control.
Journal of Political Economy , 94, 461- 488.
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. Journal of Finance, 52(2), 117-142.
Seifert, B., Gonenc, H., and Wright, J. (2005). The international evidence on performance and equity ownership by insiders, blockholders, and institutions. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 15(2), 171-191.
Wharton, C.R. and Hanson L. (1991). Advice and Dissent: Rating the Corporate Governance Compact. Harvard Business Review, 69, no.6.