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Where Tax Collection Authorities preliminarily investigate an illegality of bogus business entity to secure fraudulent invoices and offset an amount of tax, they have to consume massive collecting manpower, conduct investigations, and collect evidences , for lack of the direct evidence. This study, on these grounds, applies the game theory of prisoner’s dilemma to conduct audits and analyze strategy; the aforesaid game theory indicates that businessmen establish bogus business entity to obtain statutory invoices, then, further to counterbalance the payable tax. We expect to apply the uncooperative strategy of prisoner’s dilemma to increase the cost and risk of businessmen’s crime, overcome both parties’ psychological barrier, and further to obtain direct evidence, so as to enhance the collecting performance and deter the illegality. Our research findings discover, should we apply game theory of prisoner’s dilemma to tax-affair investigations on bogus business entity to acquire invoice for offset of the tax amount, we could thereby design a decoy (or an incentive) and threaten to have businessmen face the game of prisoner’s dilemma. In accordance with the model analysis, we may forecast that a perfect model of prisoner’s dilemma could lead businessmen who engage in fraudulent transaction to select “Confession” as their advantageous strategy.
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